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PREFACE 
Much of the information required in writing this 
thesis was acquired during my service as a Peace Corps 
volunteer in Kenya from January 196? to December 1968» 
My work in Kenya as a government officer in agriculture 
took me to many different areas of the country where I 
met a great variety of people. I spoke kiSwahili, the 
lingua franca of East Africa, as well as smatterings of the 
Kikuyu, Abaluhya, Kalenjin and Masai tribal languages. I 
drank "sundowners" of scotch and soda with European 
settlers on the veranda overlooking the garden and moon­
shine whiskey (changa) with Africans in the slums of 
Nairobi. I ate roast turkey with the Indian High Commis­
sioner at the American Ambassador's residence and roast 
mutton with spear-carrying Masai over an open fire some­
where north of Ngorigaishi, I had what is known as a 
"cross-cultural experience." It is to the many people of 
Kenya who helped make that experience so memorable and fine 
that I dedicate this thesis. 
ii 
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INTRODUCTION 
The intent of this thesis is to present an 
analytical description of the society of Kenya, with 
emphasis on the politics of that country during the current 
century. The principal tool of analysis chosen to accom­
plish the description of Kenya is the social group: a 
collection of people bound by "formal, institutionalized 
rules and characteristic, informal behavior. 
In selecting what seem to be the significant social 
groups in Kenya, the author discerned that all of the 
groups chosen shared a similarity relative to the bindings 
which hold each group together in itself and apart from 
other groups. These group bindings proved to be a social 
phenomenon called "primordial attachments.Primordial 
attachments, or bindings or ties, stem from the "givens" 
(or assumed "givens") of social existence such as kinship, 
H. S, Morris, "Ethnic Groups," in International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills 
(New York: The Macmillan Co. and the Free Press, I960), 
Vol. V, p. 68. 
^S'ee Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: 
Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New 
States," in Old Societies and New States: The Quest for 
Modernity in^Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: 
The Free Press, 1963). 
1 
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3 language, race, religion and custom. Primordial ties 
exist wherever there is an assemblage of people living 
together and regenerating themselves. But in Kenya certain 
primordial bonds, such as those of race, religion, caste 
and tribe, have served as bases for a recruitment of indi­
viduals into social groups. Since not all social groups 
are based on primordial ties (class ties, for example, also 
promote social groups), those social groups which are based 
on primordial ties may be said to constitute a special 
class or type of social group. It follows reasonably that 
this special type of social group should be called the pri­
mordial group. Thus it may be stated that in selecting 
what seem to be the significant social groups in Kenya the 
author discerned that all of the groups selected were 
primordial groups. 
It is the assumption of this thesis that the concept 
of primordial groups provides a useful tool for social 
analysis in Kenya. A description of the social relation­
ships between and among the primordial groups provides an 
instrument for understanding Kenya's society. Such a 
description serves, moreover, to define the type of society 
characteristic in Kenya. Generally, this society has been 
one of distinct primordial groups which lacked a common 
value consensus. It has been a society of primordial groups 
^See Geertz, pp. 109-113• 
3 
whose relationships were specific and limited and often 
conflicting in nature. Such a society has been termed by 
some authors a "'plural society."^ 
The order of this paper will be to introduce the 
primordial groups in Kenya, to utilize these groups in an 
analysis of Kenya's recent history, and to conclude with a 
discussion of the distinctive qualities of primordial 
groups as political groups and the possible benefits to be 
gained in utilizing primordial groups in the analyses of 
other societies. 
^See p, 108, footnote 1 below. 
Several varied and somewhat conflicting defini­
tions of the concept of ^pluralism" exist in the social 
sciences. Thus the "plural society" as it is used in this 
thesis should not be confused with other definitions of the 
concept. For discussions of the various definitions of 
pluralism see Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Pluralism and 
Polity: A Theoretical Exploration," in Pluralism in Africa, 
eds. Keo Kuper and M. G. Smith (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1969)> pp. 67-81; and 
Francis W. Coker, "Pluralism," in Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences, ed„ Edwin R. Seligman (New York: The Mac-
millan Co., 1933), Vol. II, pp. 170-174. 
CHAPTER I 
PRIMORDIAL GROUPS OF KENYA 
In this chapter the author will first introduce 
the subject for analysis, the Republic of Kenya. An 
attempt will then be made to identify and describe five 
sets of primordial groups in Kenya. 
Ai Short Introduction to Kenya 
The Republic of Kenya is a Texas-size country situ­
ated on the equator and the eastern coastline of the 
African continent. The northern three-fifths of the 
country is arid, but the southern portion contains a lush 
coastal belt and a 3,000- to 10,000-foot interior plateau 
where most people engage in agricultural activity, the main 
source of Kenya's income. 
Some writers combine Kenya with two neighboring 
countries—Tanzania and Uganda—and refer to this as East 
Africa,1 an area which shares a similar history and some 
common economic and political ties. Our concern, however, 
is with Kenya per se and although the roots of the story 
1 Called British East Africa before the three 
countries became independent African nations, 
4 
5 
extend deep into pre-colonial history, the boundaries of 
our unit of analysis are the borders which the British drew 
in making Kenya a protectorate and colony near the end of 
the 19th Century. 
The Idea of "Kabla" or Type 
British rule established borders or divisions not 
only between Kenya and neighboring countries, but also 
between people living in Kenya itself. The essence of 
colonial rule in Kenya, as in the remainder of Africa, was 
"not economic or political domination . , . but racial 
subordination,"2 The idea of racial divisions^ according 
to skin pigmentation served as the foundation for the 
colonial social system and set patterns for psychological, 
social and political behavior in Kenya. Cultural and 
economic differences also coincided with racial boundaries 
and created ritualistic caste-like relationships such as 
^Victor Co Ferkiss, Africa's Search for Identity 
(Cleveland^ The World Publishing Company, 1966), pi 77. 
3"Race" as it is utilized in this paper means 
. . a human group that defines itself and/or is defined 
by other groups as different from other groups by virtue 
of innate and immutable physical characteristics. These 
physical characteristics are in turn believed to be 
intrinsically related to moral, intellectual, and other 
non-physical attributes or abilities." Pierre L. van den 
Berghe, Race and Racism: A, Comparative Perspective 
(New York! John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 9. 
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that of master and servant»^ 
Since the beginning of colonial days, the most 
common and important racial groups as perceived by the 
people of Kenya themselves are the Asians, Africans and 
Europeans. Thus the society can, to a remarkable degree, 
be defined by the relationships which have developed among 
these three groups. 
It would be a mistake, however, to limit the social 
analysis to the racial groups only; for subgroups, found 
within the racial boundaries, are also important» The 
Swahili word kabla, meaning literally "type" or "kind," 
has a common and interesting usage in Kenya and the ques­
tions "Wewe ni kabla gani?" (What kind are you?) and "Yeye 
ni kabla gani?" (What kind is he?) are often heard. If an 
African is asked what ""kind" he is, he will invariably 
give his own "type" as one of tribe. Thus: "Mirai ni 
Gikuyu (au Masai au Elgeyo)" ioe. "I am a Kikuyu (or Masai 
or Elgeyo)If an African is asked about another African, 
the answer will once again be one of tribe. If he is asked 
about a non-African, however, his answer will be one of 
race. Thus: "Yeye ni Mzungu (au Muhindi)" i.e. "He is a 
European (or an Asian)." 
^See David E. Apter's description of this type of 
phenomenon in Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A 
Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 47« 
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The author found himself doing much the same in 
Kenya. He answered that he was an American and other 
whites were Britishers or Germans or Italians or whatever. 
Non-Europeans were, before the author began to recognize 
subracial groupings, obviously Asians or Africans.^ The 
point here is that, while people in Kenya consider others 
of a different color to belong to racial groups, they con­
sider themselves and those of a similar color to belong 
to subracial divisions. Very clear-cut subracial groups 
are found among the Africans in their tribes and among 
Asians in their caste-sect bodies. The Europeans, who 
have been and are yet today predominantly British, have 
exhibited an overall group behavior common enough to pre­
clude any distinct subracial groups. 
The Asian Racial Group 
The term "Asian," while commonly used in Kenya, is 
not always carefully defined. Sometimes Arabs are called 
Asians and sometimes the Roman Catholic Goans are not. For 
this paper, however, the Asian racial group will comprise 
all those people (including Goans) who came from or trace 
their ancestry to the countries of India and Pakistan. 
^There is one interesting inconsistency to this 
racial, subracial group analysis, A black American is in­
variably termed a European by everyone in Kenya; yet an 
African, though he may be American-educated and American-
dressed, is always and forever an African. 
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Some confusion results also from the fact that 
before the 1947 partition of India into the two separate 
countries of India and Pakistan all Asians had been called 
""Indians," Thereafter, because of the new restricted mean­
ing of the term "Indian," the expression "Asian" came into 
wide use throughout all of East Africa. Much of the 
research material used in this study was written before 
1947» however, and even some of that material written after 
1947 persists in using the term "Indian." Thus the reader 
will note that in several quotations the author has pointed 
out that "Indian" as it is being used is synonymous with 
"Asian" as the author wishes to use it. 
The latest official census in Kenya puts the Asian 
population at 176,613,^ which is approximately 2.0% of the 
nation's total. Approximately 85% of the Asians live in 
7 Kenya's five largest cities, and the following table shows 
the high Asian percentage of the populations in Kenya's ten 
largest towns. 
T. Ward Morgan and N. Manfred Shaffer, Popula­
tion of Kenya: Density and Distribution (Nairobi: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), p. 3. 
^Dharam P. Ghai, "An Economic Survey," in Portrait 
of a Minority: Asians in East Africa, ed. Dharam P. Ghai 
(Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 196$), p. 93« 
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TABLE 1 
PERCENTAGE OF ASIAN POPULATION IN KENYA'S 
TEN LARGEST TOWNSa 
City Asians 
Total 
Population 
Asian 
Percentage 
Nairobi 86 ,453 266,794 32. 4 
Mombasa 43 ,713 179,517 24. 3 
Nakuru 6 ,203 38,181 16< .2 
Kisumu 8 ,355 23,526 35. 5 
Eldoret 3 ,75a 19,605 19. .1 
Thika 2 ,336 13,952 16, .7 
Nanyuki 982 10,448 9< .4 
Kitale 2 ,065 9,342 22. .1 
Nyere 1 ,147 7,857 14. ,6 
Kericho 593 7,692 7. 7 
TOTALS 155 ,605 576,972 26.9 
(ave,) 
^Figures taken from Morgan and Shaffer, Table 3 >  
p. 5. 
Yet, although the Asian population is urban, it is 
also spread throughout the country. Each of the forty 
administrative districts in Kenya showed some Asian popula­
tion in 1962, ranging from three Asians in a total of 75,526 
people in Mandera District (in the extreme northeast section 
of the country) to 86,922 Asians in a population of 314,760 
g 
in Nairobi Extra-Provincial District, Anyone traveling 
the remote backcountry of Kenya can anticipate a duka 
(general store), Dukawalla (the Asian owner and operator), 
and his family at the next settlement or crossroads. 
^Morgan and Shaffer, Table 1, p. 3« 
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Several factors have tended to promote amalgama­
tion and unity in the Asian group. These are? 
1, A predominant language-—Gujerati--which 
originates f rom the Gujerat region of Northwest India and 
is spoken by about 70% of the Asians in Kenya. 
2, A similar socio-economic position; for although 
there are richer and poorer Asians, the group in general 
has been situated somewhat above the Africans in the hier­
archy and somewhere below the Europeans. 
3. The tendency already mentioned for both Africans 
and Europeans to view the Asians as a single group. 
4. The common practice of the government to treat 
the Asians as a single group. 
The Asian Caste-Sect Groups 
In spite of such unifying pressures, internal divi-
9 sions have developed and persisted among the Asians. 
Religious differences account for a Sikh Group, a Roman 
Catholic Goan Group, and several sect groupings within the 
Muslim religious category.Within the Hindu religious 
^For a very detailed work on Asians in East Africa 
see H. S. Morris, The Indians in Uganda (Chicago: The Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, 1968). A discussion of the paral­
lel divisive propensity among Asians in Great Britain is 
found in Rashmi Desai, Indian Immigrants in Britain 
(London; Oxford University Press, 1963)" 
^ % category is a mere classification of a collec­
tion of people and should not be confused with a group as 
the author uses this latter concept. 
The major caste groups among the Muslims are; the 
TABLE 2 
THE ASIANS OF KENYA* 
Religious 
Category Group Language 
Place of 
Origin 
Popu­
lation 
Principal 
Occupations 
Hindu Several 
castes 
Gujerati Gujerat 97,800 Traders, government 
officials, craftsmen, 
businessmen 
Muslim Several 
sects 
Gujerati Guj erat 40,100 Teachers, profession­
als , traders, planta­
tion owners 
Roman 
Catholics 
Goans Konkoni Goa 16,000 Clerks, professional 
people 
Sikh Punjabi Punjab 21,200 Mechanics, carpen­
ters, railwaymen, 
businessmen 
^This table is adapted from Table 16, p. 132, Irving Kaplan ̂  al., 
Area Handbook for Kenya (Washington, D.C.; The American University /Foreign 
Area Studies/, July 1967). The population figures are from the 1962 Census. 
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category are found several groups which formed along tradi­
tional caste lines,Table 2 above shows a breakdown of 
the Asians. 
The interesting division along caste rather than 
religious lines among Hindus resulted probably from the 
system of social exclusiveness in India which was "'insti-
1 2 tutionalized in the caste system and not in religion.^ 
The traditional caste system in India is based upon a ranked 
division of social labor but all that remains in Kenya is 
the caste exclusiveness, 
Hindu religious leaders also lack the group-building 
tool available to Muslim and Christian leaders in the 
ability to promise exclusive salvation to one's followers 
and everlasting damnation to non-believers,^^ 
Multiple reasons exist for the divisiveness of the 
Asian racial group generally, and for strong subracial 
Shia Ismailia Khoja, Sunni Hannafi, Shia Bohara, Shia 
Ithnasheri Khoja and Sunni Eschafei, The Ismailia Khoja 
(followers of the Aga Khan) are especially notable as a 
progressive and influential group both in Kenya and 
throughout East Africa, 
1 1 The most prominent of the Hindu caste groups are: 
the Brahmin, Vania, Lohana, Patildar and Jains, 
(H, S, Morris writes that: "'Strictly speaking Jains are 
not Hindus, though in East Africa they are counted among the 
Hindus as opposed to Muslims," See Morris, The Indians in 
Uganda, p. 190,) 
I^Morris, The Indians in Uganda, p, 62, 
l^lbid. 
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caste-sect groups which have developed. These are:^^ 
1. The proximity of Kenya to India and Pakistan 
with a resulting ease in communications. Old divisions 
could thus remain relevant and social exclusive policies 
such as caste or sect endogamy were made possible, 
2. The size of the Asian racial group, which 
became large enough to allow for factions. 
3. The ambitions of factional leaders. 
4. Business ties, which came to correspond to 
religious and caste ties. 
5. The existence of a "pace setter" group, the 
Shia Imami Ismailia Muslims. This group began early and 
in earnest to develop sect schools, hospitals and churches. 
6. Inadequate government support in the develop­
ment of Asian schools. The burden for school construction 
thus fell to the caste-sect groups and the resulting segre­
gated school system served thereafter to strengthen and 
maintain the subracial ties, 
7. An early failure and resulting lost opportunity 
to unite before social conflict developed between Asians 
and the other two racial groups in Kenya. This provides a 
key to understanding why Asians have not united in the 
^^Ibid., pp. 25-44; Morris, "Communal Rivalry 
Among Indians in Uganda," The British Journal of Sociology, 
VIII, No. 4 (December 1957), 306-317» 
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face of pressures from Europeans and Asians. 
Lewis A. Goser in his book The Function of Social 
Conflict writes : "The degree of group consensus prior to 
the outbreak of the conflict seems to be the most important 
factor affecting cohesion. If a group is lacking in basic 
consensus, outside threat leads not to increased cohesion, 
but to general apathy, and the group is consequently 
threatened with disintegration."^^ 
An important activity carried on by the caste-sect 
groups has been that of political interest articulation and 
pressure. They have attempted to influence government 
policies and programs especially on issues of education, 
sectarian mosque and temple land, and sectarian graveyards. 
As very small minorities with vulnerable business interests, 
the caste-sect groups did not press hard on sensitive 
issues such as government immigration laws and racial 
segregation. Their very smallness, too, prevented these 
16 groups from functioning as political parties. 
^^Lewis A. Goser, The Functions of Social Conflict 
(Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956), p. 93• 
^^For a description of caste-sect group political 
activity see Morris, The Indians in Uganda, pp. 25-44. 
See also George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg's comment on 
Asian "political communalism" below, pp. S5-Ô6.. 
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The African Racial Group 
The Africans in 1962 constituted 97% of Kenya's 
population with a total of 8,365,942 people.^7 Africans 
in Kenya are often classified into four large language 
1 A 
categories: Bantu, Nilo-Hamitic, Nilotic and Hamitic. 
R, C, Thurnwald has devised what is probably a more useful 
method for social analyses by dividing Kenya's Africans 
into two broad collections: Pastorals i.e. livestock 
1 Q 
herders, and Peasants i.e. mixed agriculturalists. ^ This 
Pastoral-Peasant partition has meaning in that the economic 
activity of each category is attached to distinct socio­
political patterns. Traditionally, the nomadic Pastorals 
have been stronger and better organized in war than the 
more sedate Peasants. 
For this study, however, the African tribal groups 
are more important than either the linguistic divisions or 
Thurnwald's socio-economic categories. Relatively little 
I^Morgan and Shaffer, p. 4. 
^%ee, for example. Lord Hailey, An African Survey 
(London; Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 28-43 ; also 
Carl G. Rosberg Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau 
Mau": Nationalism in Kenya, Published for The Hoover 
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford Univer­
sity, Stanford, California (New York and Washington: 
Frederick A, Praeger, Publishers, 1966)5 p. 2. This lin­
guistic division comes from C. G. Seligman, Races of 
Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1930)« 
''^See Ro C. Thurnwald, Black and White in East 
Africa (London; Routledge, 1935). 
16 
meaning can be attached to the fact that President Kenyatta 
and opposition leader Oginga Odinga belong respectively to 
the Bantu and Nilotic language divisions or that they are 
both members of the Peasant category. It is important to 
realize, however, that Mr. Kenyatta is a Kikuyu and 
Mr. Odinga a Luo. The development of each man's personality 
was largely conditioned by a fostering tribal culture; and 
the position of each man today (one in power and the other 
under arrest) is the result to a large degree of different 
tribal membership. 
The African Tribal Groups 
Anthropologists have correctly pointed to the fact 
that the concept of "tribe" is rather inexact. Thus Paul 
Bohannan writes; 
Some African tribes are what have been described as 
village states; others are empires of several million 
people spread over hundreds of thousands of square 
miles. Some African tribes are language groups; some 
are congeries of indefinite or indiscriminate groups 
that have been classified under a term, usually 
pejorative, by their neighbors.21 
In the process of colonizing Africa, the Europeans, 
who did not understand the ambiguity of the tribal concept, 
drew "tribal" boundaries which did not necessarily correspond 
^'^This importance of tribal membership will be 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
Paul Bohannan, Africa and Africans (Garden City, 
N.Y,; The Natural History Press, 1964)» pp• 124-125. 
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to social reality» These boundaries were made sharp in 
Kenya in accordance with the British policy of Indirect 
Rule whereby the colonists utilized tribal political insti­
tutions (or created them if necessary) in order to admin­
ister the African population. 
British "divide and rule" tactics also served to 
crystallize unstable tribal relations. The late Tom Mboya, 
22 a former African leader in Kenya, wrote: 
The European colonial powers and even missionaries 
for a long time tended to build up tribal antagonism. 
It made it easier to influence people if they could 
find an amenable tribe to use against another tribe 
which was hostile.^3 
Evidence of British use of "divide and rule" tactics was 
found in the preponderance of certain tribes in and the 
exclusion of other tribes from the colonial army and police 
in Kenya. 
An important point here is that whatever their 
historical roots and however they were changed or crystal­
lized by foreign manipulation, tribes are important in 
Kenya today. Individual Africans think of themselves as 
belonging to a certain tribe. Tribal membership has, 
^^Mr. Mboya was assassinated in Nairobi on July 5> 
1969. 
23Tom Mboya, Freedom and After (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co., 1963), p. 65. It is Mboya's position thus, 
that tribal antagonisms were the result, at least in part, 
of deliberate British practices. 
18 
moreover, a definite effect on the behavior of the indi­
vidual. A Kibuyu does not talk, dress, act or think 
exactly like a Masai, or Nandi, or Taita, Each tribe has 
some distinct social institutions which regulate behavior 
both within the group and with outsiders. 
The ambiguity of the concept of tribe has prevented 
writers from agreeing on how many tribes exist in Kenya, 
A tribal distribution map found in the Kenya population 
study by W, T. W, Morgan and N, Manfred Shaffer (which is 
reproduced as Appendix A for this paper) shows forty-five 
tribes.Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham in their book 
The Myth of Mau Mau write of "twenty-seven main tribal 
groupings."25 
Table 3 contains, however, the largest and most 
commonly recognized (by both Kenyans and outsiders) African 
tribal groups. Included also are both language categories 
and Thurnwald's basic economic activity. These economic 
activity designations should, however, be viewed with 
caution. The manner in which Africans acquire food and 
money is rapidly changing in Kenya,This Pastoral-Peasant 
^^Morgan and Shaffer, p. 33» 
^^Rosberg and Nottingham, p, 2. 
2^A good example of this change is found in the 
Kipsigis Tribe which was originally pastoral. Many 
Kipsigis are now tea farmers. 
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label should be viewed mainly as the traditional major 
economic activity of a tribe. 
TABLE 3 
MAJOR AFRICAN TRIBES OF KENYA* 
Tribe Population 
Language 
Category 
Basic Economic 
Activity 
Somali ) 
Galla ) 
Others ) 
300,000 Hamitic Pastoral 
Turkana 
Masai 
Nandi 
Kipsigis 
181 ,378 ) 
154,079 ) 
170,085 ) 
341,772 ) 
Nilo— 
Hamitic 
Pastoral 
Mi jikenda 
Abaluhya 
Gusii 
Kikuyu 
Kamba 
414,887 ) 
1,086,409 ) 
538,343 ) 
1,642,065 ) 
933,219 ) 
Bantu Peasant 
Luo 1,148,335 Nilotic Peasant 
*The population statistics for this table come from 
Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 1-7. 
The European Racial Group 
The Europeans do not have distinctive subracial 
groups such as those found within the Asian and African 
racial groups. Separate and exclusive institutions for 
education or religion or the family system are not clearly 
visible within the total European group. What has always 
existed among Europeans in Kenya, on the contrary, is a 
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general attitude which has established a common pattern of 
action and a common response to the questions of why Euro­
peans were in Kenya and how they should act toward other 
people there. This general attitude is prevalent enough and 
so well established that it may be termed the European 
27 Racist Syndrome. 
The Syndrome is basically a justification for British 
existence in Kenya as the bearers of Western civilization, 
progress and religion. Toward the Africans the Europeans 
practiced (after the initial conquering effort) a paternal­
istic racism,2# wherein the African was thought of as 
"friendly, patient, cheerful, rather stupid, lazy, but 
likeable, and of course entirely 'primitive. . . 
Toward the Asian the practice was one of competitive racism, 
wherein the Asians were thought of as poor but dangerous 
27The European Racist Syndrome is most clearly 
defined (and defended) in the writings of Elspeth Huxley, 
a Kenyan settlerwoman. See especially her two-volume 
biography of the European settler leader in Kenya, Lord 
Delamere (White Man's Country ̂ /London: Chatto and Windus 
Ltd., 193^71 and the book Race and Politics in Kenya 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1955) which contains an exchange 
of correspondence between Huxley and Margery Perham, a 
critic of European race politics. 
^^For a discussion of the concepts and practices 
of paternalistic and competitive racism see van den Berghe, 
Race and Racism. 
E. Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African Society 
(Kampala, Uganda; Department of Sociology, Makerere College, 
The University College of East Africa, 1959)» p. 272. 
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examples for ignorant Africans and obstacles to the white 
man's effort and burden of "civilizing the natives. 
Some attitudinal variations are clustered around 
the four main European occupational categories: agricul­
ture, the civil service, mission work and commerce. Kenya's 
white settler farmers have performed a function for the 
Europeans similar to that of the Imami Ismailias in the 
Asian group as "pace setters" for the race,31 Early 
settlers such as Lord Delamere worked closely with British 
colonial officers in defining and establishing the European 
Racial Syndrome, And although some missionaries and civil 
servants have been in sympathy with Africans as the 
recipients of the ill effects of racist colonial rule, this 
fact did not compromise their basically racist notions 
about Asians and Africans or their participation in the 
general European position. They did not reject the Syndrome 
during colonial days and many of those still in Kenya cling 
to its basic racial tenet. 
3C^ee pp. 29-39 below. 
This is true even though the settlers have con­
stituted only about 25% of the European group (and 10^ at 
Independence) and are themselves somewhat heterogeneous in 
that they contain a large minority (about 30%) of South 
African whites (called Kaburus by Africans in Kenya). 
See Kaplan et , p. 51 and pp. 135 = 139. 
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Summary 
The most significant social groups in Kenya have 
now been identified. Listed once again, they are: 
1. The African Racial Group 
2. The African Tribal Groups 
3. The Asian Racial Group 
4o The Asian Caste-Sect Groups 
5. The European Racial Group 
This chapter has also contained a description of 
the primordial attachments which bind the individuals of 
each group—the attachments of race, tribe, caste and 
religion. Thus these five sets of groups may now be termed 
the primordial groups of Kenya and utilized in the following 
discussion of Kenya's history. 
CHAPTER II 
A PRIMORDIAL GROUP ANALYSIS OF 
KENYA'S MODERN HISTORY 
An attempt is made in the following chapter to 
analyze Kenya's modern history (since the late 19th Cen­
tury). The method used is to focus on the relationships 
between and among the five sets of primordial groups 
introduded in Chapter I, 
Background: The Pre-Colonial Period 
It is certain that man has been living in that area 
of Africa which was to become Kenya for many thousands of 
years. Some archeologists believe, in fact, that man in his 
i 
present form originated in the East African region. Firm 
archeological evidence shows that early iron-age civiliza­
tions existed in Kenya around 700 A.D. and possible evidence 
puts iron-users there at a much earlier date—in about the 
^The findings and conclusions of Dr. L. S. B. Leakey 
support this idea. See: Basil Davidson, A History of East 
and Central Africa (New York: Anchor Booksl 1969)» pp. 4-7; 
L. S. B. Leakey, The Progress and Evolution of Man in 
Africa (London; Oxford University Press, 1961); and Leakey, 
Olduvai Gorge (Cambridge: University Press, 1965). 
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3rd Century A.D. 
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Early Tribal Relations 
The study of early African history is made difficult 
by a lack of written records. It seems certain, however, 
that by I5OO A.D. or earlier the direct ancestors of the 
modern African tribes in Kenya were already there and in­
creasing in numbers.3 After 1500, and more especially 
after I8OO, tribal conflict expanded in Kenya. These 
struggles were probably the result of growing populations 
which demanded more livestock and an increased grazing 
area. Notable successive expansive movements were made 
southward into Kenya by the Masai, Turkana and Somali 
tribes. The strength of these pastoral peoples made them 
very difficult for the agriculturists to repel. 
Several different types of internal tribal authority 
existed at this time, but the general trend was toward a 
centralization of the political system as the conflict 
increased.^ The strongest tribe in Kenya before the Euro­
pean ingress was, however, the Masai, who never did develop 
a system of centralized political control. At the height 
^Davidson, pp. 8-10, 34. 
3lbid., pp. 37, 167-177. 
4lbid., pp. 167-177. 
5a discussion of the Masai system of authority 
based on laibons or priests is found in Davidson, pp. 72-73» 
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of their power (early in the 19th Century) the Masai con­
trolled an area of Kenya about 500 miles long and 150 miles 
wide.^ 
Early Asian-African Relations 
Asians have been in contact with East Africa and 
the people living there for at least two thousand years. 
The earliest reference to their presence, which was as 
traders along the coastline, is found in a Greek merchant's 
guide book written in approximately 120 A.D, and entitled 
Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (Guide to the North-West 
Indian Ocean).^ Asians cooperated with Arabs in commer­
cial ventures (including slavery) both before the 8th Cen­
tury A.D. when Arabs made temporary settlements along the 
coast and afterwards when they began to construct permanent 
cities, 
Asian economic activity continued in East Africa 
through the Portuguese domination of main coastal cities 
during the 1500's, through a subsequent Arab resurgence, 
and into the development of British occupation which began 
^Rosberg and Nottingham, p. 4» The Masai are 
described in this book as the tribe having "... undoubt­
edly played the most important role in shaping the 
political geography of Kenya before the British occupation" 
( P . A- ) O 
^Davidson, p. 26. Authoritative histories of the 
Asians in Africa can be found in Davidson and in Hailey. 
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in the late 19th Century, 
A pattern emerges from this long history of Asians 
in Africa, Chanan Singh, a Kenyan Asian, writes: 
Concentrating upon economic enterprise, they 
/the Asian_s7 had adapted themselves in turn to the 
indigenous coastal chiefs, to the Arabs, to the 
Portuguese, to the Arabs again and » . „ to the 
British and Germans, /This German presence was in 
Tanganyika^/ To all these regimes they had been 
to a greater or less degree, economically indispen­
sable,® 
Yet although they "adapted themselves" to the regime of the 
day, Asians never merged to become an integral part of 
either the powerful alien or the indigenous African social 
system. Throughout this period the Asians remained separate, 
a group apart. Unlike the Arabs and Portuguese, they did 
not marry Africans, and unlike all of the other foreigners 
they did not exert a political influence. They limited 
themselves, rather, to business affairs and to the few 
social contacts inherent in that activity. 
The seed of African dislike for Asians must have 
been planted near the very beginning of their relationship. 
The Asian brought exotic goods, cloth and matches and metal 
pots for the African to purchase. He did not mix well or 
easily, however, and his conversation was usually limited 
^Chanan Singh, "The Historical Background," in 
Portrait of a Minority; Asians in East Africa, ed. 
Dharam P. Ghai (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 196$), 
p 0 A- ® 
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to bartering or to ordering other Africans who carried his 
wares. He must have been, from the very beginning, 
tolerated but distrusted. 
The Colonial Period (I888-I963) 
This historical epoch contains the story of the 
British establishment of a plural society in Kenya. The 
era begins and ends with European-African conflict, the 
former over the formation of Kenya as a colony, and the 
latter in the achievement of Kenya's independence, A 
European-Asian struggle dominated group relationships 
during much of the time inbetween. 
Initial African-European Conflict 
. . There were few sections of the country that 
did not experience some violent confrontation with 
9 European-led expeditions against them," 
Under the auspice first of the Imperial East Africa 
Company and later of the British Foreign Office, the Euro­
peans moved in to take Kenya by force, Rosberg and Notting­
ham list thirteen different tribes (ten of which are 
included among the major tribes in Table 3) which attempted 
to resist the British but which were eventually overcome, 
^Rosberg and Nottingham, p. 7. 
^^Ibid,, pp. 7-16, The hardest fight was put up by 
the Kalenjin group of tribes, especially the Nandi. Resis­
tance was not offered by the Masai, who bargained rather 
than fought. 
2 ê  
Two divergent pressures resulted from the European 
victory. The first was toward a greater unification among 
the African tribes. Colonial status meant a central govern­
ment at Nairobi with a relatively general administrative 
system for taxes, budgeting, crime, etc. throughout the 
country. The common languages of English and kiSwahili 
were spread, and there was finally decreased tribal conflict 
under British rule. 
The second pressure was toward the preservation and 
strengthening of tribal division through the employment of 
the concept of Indirect Rule, a practice which was discussed 
above (pp. 16-19)« Kenya's international boundaries, more­
over, were later to cause problems. The international lines 
as drawn in London split several tribes and related tribal 
groupings. The most notable of the divided tribes were the 
Masai, Somali and Abaluhya. The case of the Somali division 
resulted eventually in war, when many of the 275,000 Somalis 
11 residing in Kenya at independence took up arms with the 
aid of the Somali Republic Government and fought against 
Republic of Kenya forces. Although the Kenyatta Government 
never acknowledged the fact (the rebels were always termed 
shifta _/bandit^7)> this was a civil insurrection which 
resulted directly from the British-drawn boundary between 
Kenya and the Somali Republic. 
I^Kaplan _et al., p. 368. 
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European-Asian Relations 
Europeans were not always unhappy about Asians 
living in Kenya, although that attitude soon developed. 
Early colonial administrators encouraged Asians to move 
inland from the coast, and even settlers, later to become 
bitter antagonists of Asians, were said to have initially 
1 2 appreciated the need for Asian traders. This early 
British hospitality for Asians rested on a need to develop 
the Kenya Colony into an economic asset. Initial British 
investments were heavy in Kenya and the colonists looked to 
Asians for assistance in opening up a market economy for the 
country. 
The most expensive of the early British investments 
in Kenya was a railway, begun in Mombasa in 1Ô95 and con­
structed across Kenya at a cost of E9,500 a mile.^^ Some 
32,000 Asians were recruited in the British colony of India 
and brought to Kenya for the construction effort, as it was 
felt that Africans lacked even the basic skills required 
for the work. Under the terms of the work contract, the 
Asian coolies were granted the option of a return passage 
to India or the right to stay in Kenya. When the railroad 
W. Hollingsworth, The Asians of East Africa 
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1960), pp. 52-53• 
11 ^Zoe Marsh and G. W. Kingsworth, An Introduction 
to the History of East Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966), p. T62. 
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was completed after reaching Kisumu on Lake Nyanza (Victoria) 
in 1901) 6,724 Asian workers stayed in Kenya, a figure which 
added 19% to the Asian population. 
The intermingling of the Asian and European elements 
in Kenya produced eventually a conflict centered around four 
issues; 
1. The reservation of the Highland Region for 
European farmers only. 
2. Urban racial segregation, 
3. "Communal" i.e. racial legislative represen­
tation. 
1 5 
4. Immigration policies. 
An influx of white settlers into Kenya, beginning 
around 1900, was quite important for the country's history. 
Colonies throughout Africa which contained white settlers 
^^Of the remaining workers, 2,000 died in Kenya and 
the others returned to India, For a discussion of and 
statistics on the railway construction see Morris, The 
Indians of Uganda, p. Ô, and George Delf, Asians in East 
Africa (London; Oxford University Press, 19^3)> PP« 1Ô-
14. A common misconception among both Africans and Euro­
peans in Kenya is that all of the Asians in Kenya came 
originally from this construction crew. (See, for example, 
Elspeth Huxley, White Man's Country /2 vols.; London: 
Chatto and Windus Ltd., 19^^/, I, pp. 64-65.)  Morris com­
ments on this myth in The Indians in Uganda, p. 9. 
^^See Hollingsworth, p. 76; Hailey, p. 406; and 
Carl G. Rosberg Jr., "Political Conflict and Change in 
Kenya," in Transition in Africa; Studies in Political 
Adaptation, ed. Gwendolen M. Carter and William 0. Brown 
(Boston; Boston University Press, 195#), p. 3^o 
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have been qualitatively different from colonies which did 
not.^^ White settlers quickly tended to develop loyalties 
to their new home and sought to exert an influence on its 
future progress. In Kenya (as elsewhere) the settlers began 
early to demand a voice in the Colonial Government, This 
demand did not upset colonial officials because there was 
originally little difference between settler and official 
views on expanding white power in the colony. 
The Highland area which attracted European settle-
17 
ment comprises about 7>000,000 acres of land suitable for 
agriculture, and lies at an elevation high enough to give 
it a temperate climate. It was from this area that settlers 
sought to bar Asian land purchases. They initially accom­
plished the prohibition through a partnership of 
Sir Charles Eliot, the chief British representative in 
Kenya from 1901 to 1904» and Lord Delamere, the leading 
settler spokesman from his arrival in Kenya in 1903 to his 
death in 1931» In 1903, Eliot restricted Asian land owner­
ship to small plots outside the Highland region,and in 
^^See Leonard Thompson's article on "tropical" 
colonies and "temperate" colonies in Africa for an inter­
esting discussion of this point. 
1  7  
St, Clair Drake, "Some Observations on Inter-
ethnic Conflict As One Type of Intergroup Conflict,"' 
Conflict Resolution, I, No. 2  (June 1957), 167. 
1^George Bennett, Kenya; A Political History 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 13, also 
M. P. K. Sorrenson, "Land Policy in Kenya: 1095-1945»" in 
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1905 a Land Commission chaired by Delamere stated that 
while there was 
. . .  n o  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  
Indians /i.e. Asians/ should hold land in the 
Protectorate . . . considering only a small area of 
the Protectorate is suitable for European settle­
ment and colonization, it is desireable that land 
within that area /the Highlands/ should be reserved ,g 
for the support and management of a white population. 
These actions were then followed by the Elgin 
Pledge of 1906 wherein Colonial Secretary Lord Elgin stated 
somewhat lamely that: 
It is not consonant with the view of His Majesty's 
Government to impose legal restrictions on any par­
ticular section of the community, but as a matter of 
administrative convenience grants in the upland area 
should not be made to Indians /i.e. Asian_s7. 
The policy of land discrimination was then firmed up by the 
Crowns Land Ordinance of 1915 which gave the Governor in 
Kenya a veto power over cross-racial land exchanges, thus, 
in practice, effectively barring Asians from the White 
Highlands. 
The question of political representation centered 
on membership in the Legislative Council. The Council, 
History of East Africa, ed, Vincent Harlow, E. M. Chilver 
and Alison Smith (London; Oxford University Press, 1965), 
II, pp. 680-682, 
1^Quoted in Singh, p, 6. 
^^Quoted in Huxley, p, 209. 
2"'See Sorrenson, pp. 600-682, 
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which was in part locally elected, was created to advise 
the Governor, Many Europeans and Asians regarded it as 
the forerunner to a parliamentary body under eventual self-
rule <, As the larger of the two contending racial groups, 
the Asians pressed for representation in proportion to 
population. This ambition was successfully fought by the 
Europeans. 
The Asians did gain early representation on the 
Council (1909) in the person of Mr. A. M« Jeevanjee, But 
the communal type of representation employed in deciding 
Council membership always left the Asians with many fewer 
delegates than the Europeans. For Kenya as a whole, of 
course, the reverse is true, as the Asian population has 
22 always greatly outnumbered the European population. 
Immigration policies and urban residential segre­
gation were challenged by Asians on the principle of 
23 
equality before the law* Here again, however* they met 
?? 
The African group was not considered an important 
or very worthy element in Kenya's society at this time. 
The first African to serve on the Council, Mr, Eluid îfethu, 
did not join the body until 1944. 
^^Immigration policies, unlike residential segre­
gation, did not, however, discriminate against Asians per 
se. They did work a difficulty on the relatively poorer 
Asian group by establishing a fee test» This fee was E$0 
prior to 193# and E500 thereafter» See G. Kondapi, Indians 
Overseas? 1838-1949 (Madras: Oxford University Press, 
1951), p. l4$, 
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with little success. Inequality was, in fact, ingrained 
throughout the law and custom of the land. Discriminatory 
legal distinctions were made in ordinances, judicial 
administration and taxation as well as in political repre­
sentation and residence. Unofficial discrimination was 
practiced in the imposition of unequal wage scales for 
Asian and European personnel, 
Much heated European rhetoric was directed against 
the Asians for other reasons, too. Lord Delamere spoke of 
the discouragement Asians gave to white settlement and 
African economic development by "monopolizing" many low-
income jobs and small businesses. Delamere proclaimed the 
Asians to be a bad moral and religious influence on the 
Africans.25 An Economic Commission Report of 1919, which 
was signed by five settlers (including Delamere) and two 
British colonial officials, publicized supposed Asian moral 
depravity and cited them as carriers of disease and 
inciters to crime and vice, Elspeth Huxley describes the 
Asians in 1935 as the most "persistent problem" for the 
colony.Throughout all of this rhetoric, the European 
Racial Syndrome may be discerned. The position taken by the 
24see Kondapi; p. 355° 
^^Huxley, I, pp. 206-208, 
^^Ibid., pp. 64-65, 
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Europeans was that they themselves had come to Africa with 
the good of the African in mind and that the Asians consti­
tuted a threat to that good. 
The Asian-European struggle led to two British 
Government actions in the early 1920's? the Wood-Winterton 
Agreement and the Devonshire White Paper. The Wood-
Winterton Agreement is interesting in that it reveals the 
prevailing mood among the settlers. In 1922, the Colonial 
and Indian Offices in London made an attempt to settle the 
European-Asian conflict by drawing up a report which was 
named after Mssrs» Wood and Winterton, the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretaries of the two offices. This report called 
fort 
1. The prohibition of urban segregation. 
2. An end to restricted immigration. 
3. A common European-Asian voting roll based on 
education and property, and insuring at least 10% of the 
Asians would be franchised. 
4. Four seats for Asians on the Legislative 
Council,27 
Settler reaction to Wood-Winterton was furious. It 
created among them what Huxley called the "old Bostonian 
^^Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 65-66, 
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n d 
spirit»" A vigilance committee was formed to make contin­
gency plans for armed action against the colonial government. 
There were plans to seize the railway and telegraph and to 
kidnap the Governor. Before any of this could be put into 
effect; however, delegations from the government and the 
European and Asian groups traveled to London to aid the 
British Government in producing the important Devonshire 
White Paper of 1923» 
This Paper, which was a declaration of policy by the 
British Government, stated that: 
1. The European monopoly on the Highlands would 
remain, 
2. There were to be no immigration restrictions 
on Asians as such* 
3. The official policy of urban segregation was 
to end, 
4. Eleven Europeans, five Asians and one Arab were 
to be elected to the Legislative Council. 
5» African interests were paramount 
This final provision, dealing with African interests, 
has in retrospect been the most important» The key sentence 
of the White Paper readsî 
O Ù .  
For a detailed discussion of the reaction see 
Huxley, I, pp. 110-139» 
^%ollingsworth, pp. 99-1 Oâ. 
37 
Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His 
Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely 
to record their considered opinion that the interests 
of the African natives must be paramount, and that 
if, and when, those interests and the interests of 
the immigrant races should conflict the former should 
prevail. 
In announcing African paramountry the British Government 
rejected for Kenya, by strong implication at least, what 
eventually came about in both South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia: the emergence of political rule by a small Euro­
pean minority. 
In their colonial-period struggle with Europeans, 
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the Asians both gained victories and suffered defeats. 
The most obvious failure was in never achieving equal 
status with the Europeans whom they greatly outnumbered. 
The Asians received only five members in the Legislative 
Council by the Devonshire White Paper of 1923 and one mem­
ber thereafter. The imbalance was made more grievous by 
the fact that during the same period of time, from 1923 to 
1963, the Asian population increased eightfold. When a 
common roll was finally achieved in 196O, it was primarily 
a result of African rather than Asian pressure. It was 
the Africans, too, who broke the racial barrier to land 
purchase in the Highlands. Another Asian failure is 
demonstrated in the fact that the principle of integrated 
^'^This discussion of success and failure is based 
on Delf, pp. 41-42. 
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education was never fully accepted while Kenya was a colony. 
It may be concluded thus that in general the disadvantages 
for the darker races in Kenya either remained or were 
solved by reasons other than Asian pressure. 
Much of the explanation for Asian failures springs 
from the certainty that in combating the Europeans, and 
especially the settlers, the Asians were up against a foe 
which fought with unusual energy, fierce self-interest and 
only slightly restricted tactics. The Asians, meanwhile, 
were conscious of India's poverty and colonial status, were 
often relatively poor and ill-educated, and were, most 
importantly, internally divided. 
The greatest contribution of the Asian group in 
its struggle was the restraint placed upon any European 
movement toward "self rule." As the historian George Bennett 
writes: "It may well be that it was only their /the 
Asians^y rivalry which prevented the Europeans from estab­
lishing their position in Kenya as in places further 
south." Asian opposition to the Europeans combined with 
smallness of the European Racial Group and the insistence 
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of Africans to bring uhuru. 
^^Bennett, Kenya: A Political History, p. 47. 
^^Uhuru is the Swahili word for freedom, and in 
this common context it refers to freedom from colonial 
rule or to independence. 
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A few Asians, such as M. A. Desai (a journalist), 
Isher Dass (a politician) and Makan Singh (a labor 
3 3 organizer), gave outright aid to radical Africans, but 
it was the indirect aid of Asian opposition to European 
domination which counted most. The significance of re­
straining the European group was recognized early by Asians» 
Thus in 1929, the President of a common Asian organization 
known at the time as the East African Indian National Con­
gress (EAINC) commented on the 1923 Devonshire White Paper; 
However galling the decision of the Imperial 
Government regarding the claims put forward by 
Indians might have been to Indian self respect, it 
was felt that the acceptance of the paramountcy of 
native interests as the cornerstone of British 
policy in East Africa removed the danger of control 
passing into the hands of an oligarchy of alien 
settlers.34 
Asian Caste-Sect Relations and 
the Weakness of the EAINC 
The EAINC was created in 1914 to act as an inter­
mediary in communications between the Kenya Government and 
the Asian caste-sect groups and to serve as a voice of 
appeal to the British and Indian Governments.^^ The EAINC, 
33see Singh, pp. 1-11. 
^^Written by Mr. Pandit H. N. Kunzru, and quoted in 
Roger K. Tangri, "Asians in Kenya: A Political History," 
Africa Quarterly, VI (July-September 1966), 110. 
35india was of course at this time a British 
colony, and the appeal went to the Secretary of State for 
India in the British Cabinet, 
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rather than possessing significant central authority, how­
ever, was based upon strong local organizations.^^ This 
localism in combination with the social divisiveness of 
the Asians rendered the association to the position of no 
more than a very weak spokesman. The EAINC was renamed 
the Kenya Indian Congress in 1952, but this did not change 
its lack of vigor. 
Final African-European Conflict: 
The State of Emergency and 
Independence 
The final decade of colonial rule in Kenya was 
marked by a violent struggle of African guerrilla fighters 
called the Mau Mau against British forces.This fight 
did not suddenly appear without a process of maturation, 
of course, for although the European-Asian conflict had 
held center stage, there had been for many years a growing 
African resentment over European policies in Kenya. The 
3%or example, the Indian Association of Mombasa, 
which was formed in 1900, long before the EAINC. 
^^A discussion of the EAINC is found in Yash Tandon, 
"A Political Survey," in Portrait of a Minority: Asians 
in East Africa, ed„ Dharam P. Ghai (Nairobi: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 196$), pp. 71-75» Tandon stresses "divide 
and rule" tactics used by Europeans as a source for EAINC 
division, but I doubt its importance and look rather to the 
basic social divisions within the Asian group. 
^^A good description and analysis of this struggle 
is found in Rosberg and Nottingham's The Myth of Mau Mau. 
The term Mau Mau is of uncertain and disputed origin. 
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discontent centered especially on the European settler land 
acquisition and on economic and social restrictions which 
impeded African development» 
The animosity was not limited to one tribe, but 
among Kikuyus resentment ran deepest and it was within 
this tribe that organized opposition to European rule 
developed. 
It would be difficult to overestimate a peasant 
African's feeling for his shamba (farm or land). This 
attachment, which goes beyond economics to include emotion, 
is well expressed by Jomo Kenyatta in his anthropological 
study of the Kikuyu tribe: 
39 . . .  t o  a n y o n e  w h o  w a n t s  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  G i k u y u  
problems, nothing is more important than a correct 
grasp of the question of land tenure. For it is 
the key to the peoples' life; it secures for them 
that peaceful tillage of the soil which supplies 
their material needs and enables them to perform 
their magic and traditional ceremonies in undis­
turbed serenity, facing Mount Kenya.40 
It was the Kikuyu especially who felt that many of the 
European farms were set illegally on their ancestral land. 
And it was the Kikuyu who gradually and increasingly began 
to demand the return of this land. 
In addition to the question of land, Africans began 
39The spelling of Kikuyu with a "G" (Gikuyu) is a 
local variation. 
40jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal 
Life of the Gikuyu (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), 
p o XXi. 
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to develop an awareness that they were being blocked by 
Europeans from fulfilling new and rising expectations in 
life. The sociologist, St. Clair Drake, offers these 
examples of "new rights" which Kenya's Africans began to 
demand, 
1, Buying small items of consumption goods, 
2, Providing education for the children, 
3, Occupying new status which has been created 
in an expanding social structure. 
4, Earning money. 
5, Going into business, 
6, Buying and selling land,^^ 
Tom Mboya analyzed the African feelings in writing 
that , Mau Mau was the child of economic and social 
problems which had accumulated over the years and which had 
not found any solution through constitutional channels, 
The fact that most of the organized African opposi­
tion and virtually all of the Mau Mau rebellion itself was 
confined to the Kikuyu tribe was to have lasting signifi­
cance. The reasons behind the confinement are twofold, 
1, The Kikuyu felt most deeply the loss of 
traditional land, 
^^Drake, pp, 167-160. 
^^Mboya, p, 40, 
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2, As the most progressively oriented tribe in 
Kenya, they were most bitter about economic and social 
restrictions « 
The other Africans held a rather ambivalent feeling 
about Mau Mau.^^ Doubtless there was sympathy for the 
guerrillas as champions of the African cause. But there 
was jealousy, too, over the state of Kikuyu progress. The 
government restrictions which were placed on the Kikuyu 
during the fight opened up new opportunities for other 
Africanso As a result of African ambivalence, the Colonial 
Government was easily able to recruit and deploy African 
troops against the Mau Mau, 
Systematic opposition to European rule in Kenya 
began with tjie formation in 1922 of the East African Associ­
ation (EAA), directed by a Kikuyu government clerk named 
Harry Thuku, Thuku was arrested and exiled in 1922 and the 
EAA was followed by a second organization of protest in 
1923 called the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), 
The KCA dispatched Johnstone (later Jomo) Kenyatta 
to London in 1928 to act as a lobbyist for African interests. 
It wasn't until 1946 that Kenyatta returned permanently to 
Kenya to take up the leadership of the African cause and 
eventually the reins of government, 
43See Philip Mason, "The Plural Society of Kenya," 
in Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism in Intertropical Communi­
ties (Brussels: INCIDI, 1957), p. 328, 
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From its formation in 1923 to its official banning 
in 1940, the KCA pursued a two-pronged strategy. There 
was an effort, first, to win over Kikuyu elders, Christians 
and partially educated youth. An attempt was made, 
secondly, to establish contact with dissidents in the 
remaining tribes, African unhappiness was increasingly 
demonstrated in anti-European religious movements and anti-
missionary African schools. 
Military service during World War I led to cross-
tribal and cross-national contacts for African soldiers, 
and the resulting socio-political sophistication probably 
contributed to the anti-European organizations of the 
1920'S. Similarly, after World War II a new association 
quickly arose to replace the prohibited KCA, Known as the 
Kenya Africa Union (KAU), this organization was headed by 
Jomo Kenyatta after his return to Kenya. The KAU pressed 
for reforms beneficial to Africans. Frustration in this 
attempt brought on in 1952 the Mau Mau uprising, the im­
prisonment of Kenyatta and other African leaders, and a 
declaration of a State of Emergency by Kenya Governor 
Sir Evelyn Baring. 
The specific incident which prompted Baring's 
declaration was the October 7, 1952, murder of Kikuyu 
^^These African educational institutions were 
confined mainly to the Kikuyu tribe. 
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Senior Chief Waruhiu by unknown assassinsThe Governor 
then announced on October 20, that "a public emergency has 
arisen which makes it necessary to confer special powers 
on the Government and its officers for the purpose of main­
taining law and order.But the declaration had just the 
opposite effect, and both sides mounted a campaign of ter­
ror which was to last for some four years. 
In addition to the imprisonment of Kenyatta and 
other KAU leaders, the government program consisted of the 
following measures; 
1o The deployment of European and African armed 
forces. 
2. A siege of the Kikuyu area of Kenya. 
3. A reinstitution of "tribal discipline" with 
an emphasis on the authority of tribal chiefs and subchiefs» 
4. A system of photographs used in identification 
checks » 
5. The call for British troops and British General 
Sir George Erskine to lead government forces. 
6o The use of "cleansing oaths" to remove anti-
European oaths taken at a government estimate by 90% of 
the Kikuyu tribe. 
45under the system of Indirect Rule, chiefs were 
government officers. 
^^Quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, p. 277° 
^^See Rosberg and Nottingham, pp. 277-319» 
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An analysis of statistics from several sources^^ 
shows the bloody cost of the conflict. To the end of 1956 
there were; 
Rebel Losses 
11,503 Kikuyu killed 
1 ,035 Captured wounded 
1,550 Captured unwounded 
26,625 Arrested 
2,714 Surrendered 
Civilian and Government Casualties 
95 Europeans killed (about 65^ of whom were 
police or military personnel) 
127 Europeans wounded 
29 Asians killed 
48 Asians wounded 
1,920 Africans killed (about 25^ of whom were 
police or military personnel) 
The deployment of British troops during the Emergency 
was to have a profound effect upon the course of Kenyan 
politics, for power passed effectively from the European 
group to the British Governmento As George Bennett writes, 
the "Imperial Factor" returned then, and decisions were more 
^%osberg and Nottingham, p. 303; Mason, p. 32#; 
and Delf, p. 39» 
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49 and more made in London* These decisions centered around 
a rapid but late series of reforms, the purpose of which 
was to create undivided loyalty among Africans not actually 
participating in the uprising. 
In June 1955> African political associations were 
allowed at the district level and under the Lyttleton (1954) 
and Lennox-Boyd (195Ô) constitutions African influence was 
increased within a multiracial concept of government, 
African politicians, however, followed the leadership of the 
then young Luo trade unionist, Tom Mboya, in pressing for 
more radical demands. Six of the eight African members 
elected to the Legislative Council by the first direct 
African elections in March 1957, opposed the idea of multi­
racial government and demanded majority rule instead. In 
June 195#; Mr. Oginga Odinga shocked the Europeans by asking 
in the Legislative Council that Jomo Kenyatta be released 
to assume political leadership for Africans. 
With an increasing prospect for independence, the 
African racial group began to split along tribal lines and 
the smaller tribes, fearful of a Kikuyu-Luo hegemony, formed 
in 1969, a political party known as the Kenya African Demo­
cratic Union (KADU). Important KADU leaders were Masinde 
Muliro (an Abaluhya), Ronald Ngala (a Mijikenda) and 
Daniel arap Moi (a Kalenjin). The opposition party, Kenya 
^^Bennett, Kenya: A Political History, p. 134» 
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African Nationalist Union (KANU) was headed by James Gichuru 
(a Kikuyu) and the Luos, Mboya and Odinga. 
Elections which were held in 1961 gave KANU over 
two-thirds of the vote, but KANU party chief Mboya refused 
to form a government except under Kenyatta's leadership. 
The Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, fearful of Jomo Kenyatta 
as the leader of "'darkness and death," then attempted to 
help KADU (which had received less than one-fifth of the 
vote) to govern the country. This attempt lasted for two 
years until Kenyatta, who was released in 1961, led KANU 
to an African majority government in June 1963, and to inde­
pendence from Britain on December 12, 1963» 
Throughout the decade of African-European conflict 
leading to independence, the Asians played a very minor 
role. Only in I960 was any organized effort made by Asians 
in support of majority rule based on a common role with 
"open" rather than "communal" (racially assigned) legisla­
tive seats. The organization formed in I960 (called Kenya 
Freedom Party)was, however, clearly the political expres­
sion of but a minority of the Asian group. 
^^The Kenya Freedom Party later merged with KANU. 
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Kenya Since Independence 
Constitutional Organization 
The most obvious political fact of post-independent 
Kenya is the charismatic strength of President Jomo Kenyatta. 
Mzee (the Old Man), as he is called, became Prime Minister 
with independence in 1963 and President in 1964 when Kenya 
discarded dominion status and became a republic within the 
British Commonwealth. Criticism of the Kenyatta Government 
has, until very recently, been directed not at Mzee but 
toward other officials or KANU leaders. 
The Kenya Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary, but administrative and legislative functions are 
joined through the President and his cabinet, all of whom 
are members of Parliament. The President is the leader of 
the largest party in Kenya's 17$-member Parliament and 
chooses as ministers of his cabinet other Parliamentary 
members to head the several departments of administrationo 
Two political parties have challenged KANU rule: 
KADU, which existed before independence, and Kenya People's 
Union (KPU), which was formed in 1966, KADU disbanded 
when its leaders joined KANU on the first anniversary of 
^^Recent departures from this mode are described 
in Chapter IV below. 
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independence in December 1964»^^ KPU, which was led from 
the outset by former Vice President Oginga Odinga was 
banned and its leaders arrested in late 1969° 
An administrative reorganization in 1966 raised the 
number of administrative Provinces from six to seven, but 
left the Number of Districts at forty.Each Province and 
District has a Nairobi-appointed chief administrative officer 
along with staff members from each of the ministries. 
Government Policy; 
African Socialism 
The policies of the Kenyatta Government are framed 
in reference to and given direction by a broad ideology 
termed African Socialism. As described in official 
speeches and publications, African Socialism includes as its 
main features; 
1„ Political democracy. 
2„ Mutual social responsibility.^^ 
3. Various forms of ownership. 
52of the three prominent KADU leaders mentioned 
previously, Masinde Muliro is now Chairman of the Kenya 
Maize Marketing Board (and a member of Parliament), Ronald 
Ngala is Minister for Cooperatives and Social Services, 
and Daniel arap Moi is Kenya's Vice President. 
^^See the map in Appendix B. 
5^By "mutual social responsibility" the Government 
means a spirit of common duty shared by all Kenyans to 
care for the general welfare. This idea is most often 
expressed in the official slogan of the Kenyatta Govern­
ment --"Ha^ambee" or "Let's all pull together." 
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4» A range of controls to ensure that property is 
used in the mutual interests of society and its members. 
5o Diffusion of ownership to avoid concentration 
of economic power, 
60 Progressive taxes to ensure an equitable dis­
tribution of wealth and income. 
7. Central planning and direction. 
The twin themes continuously stressed by the 
Kenyatta Government are economic development with just or 
fair distribution. Thus the KANU Manifesto published in 
November 1969» states: 
The fundamental objective of Kanu Government 
is to achieve independence for Kenya. We shall 
therefore strive to attain the fastest rate of 
economic growth and to secure a just distribution 
of the national income, both between different 
areas of the country and between individuals.56 
The same objectives are found in the opening sentence of 
African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya: 
"With independence, Kenya intends to mobilize its resources 
to attain a rapid rate of economic growth for the benefit 
of its people. 
55See Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!: The Prime Minister 
of Kenya's Speeches 1963-1964 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964); also African Socialism and Its Application to 
Planning in Kenya (Nairobi; Government Printer, 1965), 
especially p. 16. 
^^Published in the East African Standard, 
November 19, 1969» p. 3, 
^^African Socialism, p. 1. 
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In addition to setting broad goals, the KANU Mani­
festo of 1969 lists central yet specific policy objectives 
of the Kenyatta Government. These are: 
I0 Government control of developmental finances. 
2o Free medical care for all. 
3. Seven years' free education. 
4. Land consolidation, increased agricultural 
output and resettlement of landless Africans. 
5. Self-sufficiency in food supplies. 
60 Provision for "fresh clean" water for humans 
and livestock. 
7. Mineral prospecting. 
8. Development of internal communications, 
9. Kenyanization of ownership and management of 
commerce and industry. 
10. Africanization of the Civil Service. 
11. Social Security benefits and minimum wages for 
laborers. 
12. Maintenance of strong armed forces. 
13» Promotion of ties with Uganda and Tanzania. 
14. Greater African economic and political inte­
gration throughout the continent. 
15 « "Positive non-alignment" in foreign policy 
5^East African Standard, November 19, 1969, 
pp. 3-5» 
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Problems in the Policy of 
Equitable Distribution 
An evaluation of progress made by the Kenyatta 
Government in achieving the twin goals of economic develop­
ment and equitable distribution shows that while develop­
ment has advanced fairly rapidly since independence, dis­
co 
tribution has lagged behind. 
Equitable distribution is seen by the Kenya Govern­
ment as the means to prevent the emergence of a social class 
system. Thus an official publication states that: 
The sharp class divisions that once existed in 
Europe have no place in African Socialism and no 
parallel in African society. No class problem arose 
in the traditional African society and none exists 
today among Africans. The class problem in Africa, 
therefore, is largely one of prevention, in 
particular--
(i) to eliminate the risk of foreign economic 
domination; and 
(ii) to plan development so as to prevent the 
emergence of antagonistic classes."^ 
But the fact that economic divisions which give 
rise to class distinctions are growing in Kenya is readily 
^^Discussions of Kenya's post-independence economic 
growth can be found in: Kaplan _et al.; The New York Times* 
January 31, 1966, p. 62; and "Business Makes a Kenya 
Safari," Business Week, No. 19&3 (September 2, 1967), 
p. 10#. Comparative national industrial production figures 
can be found in U.N., Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, United Nations Statistical Yearbook (1968) 
(New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations, 1968), 
p. 155» For an informative book on the basis of the Kenyan 
economy see A. M. O'Connor, An Economic Geography of East 
Africa (New York: Frederick A» Praeger Publishers, 1966). 
^^African Socialism, p. 12, 
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apparent. This author remembers remarking to an African 
farm laborer, Mr. Arap Tari, that because of limited 
nutrition most Africans were rather slender, but that a 
few Africans stood out from the norm by their obesity. 
Arap Tari replied that these few were clearly either 
government officials or businessmen. The explanation, he 
said, was Wananyonya (they are suckling). 
Opposition leader Oginga Odinga and his KPU have 
used the failure of equitable distribution as the main 
attack on KANU.^^ Reflecting in 196? on post-Uhuru Kenya, 
Odinga commented: 
Their ̂ the KANU politicians^? interpretation of 
independence and African Socialism is that they 
should move into the jobs and privileges previously 
held by the settlers. If Kenya started uhuru without 
an African elite class she is now rapidly acquiring 
one. Ministers and top civil servants compete with 
one another to buy more farms, acquire more director­
ships and own bigger cars and grander houses.o2 
And again he remarks; 
In six months an M.P. receives more money than 
the average peasant earns in half a life time."3 
This salary scale reflects nothing like the true 
Odinga's autobiography Not Yet Uhuru presents his 
personal history and philosophy and a history of KPU. 
^^Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru; An Autobiography 
(New York; Hill and Wang"^ 1967) , p. 302. 
^^Annual salaries for M.P.'s have risen from a flat 
E620 (about $1770) to CI 200 ($3430) plus daily sitting 
allowance, mileage and other allowances. The salary for 
Junior Ministers is 112260 ($6460) and for the President 
El 5,000 ($42,860) tax-free. 
The author's experience with farm laborers puts 
their average annual salary at about $150. 
55 
economic standards in the country, and can only 
encourage the emergence of a governing group that 
is almost as remote from the mass of the people as 
were the former colonial administrators. 
Finally, Odinga concludes: 
Many have begun to use their positions in 
politics to entrench themselves as a propertied 
economic group, A self-entrenched class of 
politician-businessmen is growing up in the cities, 
and in the countryside a large land owning class«"5 
The obviously political statements made by former 
Vice President Odinga might be questioned to some degree, 
but other critics, both foreign and domestic, say the same 
thing. Thus the American University publication, Area 
Handbook for Kenya, states : 
Among Africans, an elite has emerged which 
exercises power and enjoys a level of living sub­
stantially different from that of the rural 
African, the ordinary wageworkers, and the fairly 
large number of unemployed characteristic of the 
country in the middle 1960's.^" 
In Kenya itself, a revealing report was published 
in i960 of a study made under the auspices of the National 
Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK). Among other things, 
this report entitled Who Controls Industry in Kenya comments 
on the previously mentioned Government plans to eliminate 
the "risk of foreign economic domination" and to ^prevent 
^^Odinga, pp. 302-303» 
65lbid., p. 303. 
^^Kaplan _et , p. l62. 
56 
the emergence of antagonistic classes 
Addressing itself to the first point of these plans, 
the study reveals that of the top fifty directors of private 
business concerns in Kenya (i.e« those men having the most 
directorships) only seven are Kenyans, and of the seven only 
6Ô 
four are Africans. 
What the working party that made the study feared, 
in fact, was that in the Kenyatta Government's all-out 
attempt to bring about development, too little attention was 
being paid to distribution. The study quotes a former 
Research Fellow at University College, Nairobi, Mr. Peter 
Morris, as writing: "A purely economic logic of national 
growth would probably lead, in a decade or so, to the con­
solidation of a professional, managerial and political 
elite."^9 
Morris goes on to predict that without special 
efforts at dispersing Kenya's wealth the country will find 
large slum areas developing around the cities. These 
impoverished areas would, Morris believes, necessitate 
heavy-handed punitive efforts by government to control 
^^See p. 54 above. 
National Cristian Council of Kenya, Department of 
Christian Education and Training, Who Controls Industry in 
Kenya (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), 
p. 257o This work will hereafter be referred to as WCIIK. 
^%CIIK, p. 261. 
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restive and crime-prone unemployed residents. For the 
rural areas Morris foresees the possibility of a growing 
"marginal landless" labor group in what are apparently 
prosperous areas and hard and increasing poverty in the 
less-developed regions of the country. He concludes 
that: "The national economy will be making encouraging 
progress; but the nation will be falling apart. 
Another commentator, Mr. A. 0. Menya, is quoted 
from a speech he gave at an NCCK Conference in 1966 as 
saying: 
There is a clear class division in Kenya's 
society which is based largely on the share of eco­
nomic wealth of the nation. Kenya's society pro­
vides a very good example of the haves and have-
nots. . . . Kenya's economy is growing very rapidly, 
but the gap between classes or between the haves 
and have-nots seems to be widening. There is clear 
evidence of a few African political and bureaucratic 
çlite who are slowly merging with the commercial 
elite to form an apex at the top of the socio­
political and economic elite, while the majority of 
Africans linger helplessly below the totem pole. 
This trend may defeat the very tenet of African 
socialism which in effect may lead to another 
revolution of an unanticipated nature and which 
may end up in the disintegration of the whole 
Kenya society.71 
A paragraph from the study summarizes this deep problem for 
Kenya: 
Perhaps two points are most crucial: First, 
we must recognize that development inevitably 
7Qlbid., p. 262. 
71lbid., p. 259. 
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brings inequalities; it is bound to increase 
social tensions, to widen gaps, to reward some 
more than others. Secondly, we may ask whether 
more needs to be done to share the fruits of 
development, to increase the social cohesion of 
the nation, and to prevent an undue portion of 
power being concentrated in too few hands.72 
Summary 
This chapter contained an attempt to analyze 
Kenya's modern history by concentrating on the relation­
ships of the primordial groups. The analysis is not com­
plete, however, for there remains the task of investi­
gating current primordial group relations» As an intro­
duction to this investigation, the last section of this 
chapter (entitled Kenya Since Independence) provided an 
account of recent events. We are now able, therefore, to 
proceed with the next two chapters, both of which deal 
with current primordial group relations in Kenya. 
72rbid. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CONTEMPORARY ASIAN-AFRICAN 
RELATIONSHIP 
One result of Kenyan independence was a sharp 
decline in the power of the European racial group. This 
decline of European strength allows the description of 
primordial group relations since independence to concen­
trate on the Asians and Africans, Chapter III takes up 
the important African-Asian racial group relationship. 
The chapter contains, first, a discussion of the attitudes 
and actions of each group toward the other. Also included 
in this chapter is an account of recent economic pressures 
put on the Asians by the Kenyatta Government, The 
chapter concludes with a summation of possible recourses 
for Asians in the face of this official pressure. 
Background to the Relationship; 
A Quest ion ëf Gitizenship 
Some Asians had, before independence, balked at the 
idea of African rule; a few others chose the opposite 
direction, formed the Kenya Freedom Party and supported 
uhuru, Most, however, remained passive and failed to take 
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any action at all. But with independence came a necessary 
test of Asian attitudes in the form of choice of citizen­
ship o 
Incoming African leaders and outgoing colonialists 
devised a system whereby automatic Kenyan citizenship was 
granted to any Asian born in Kenya who had at least one 
parent who was also born in Kenya and who (the parent) was 
at the date of independence a British citizen or British-
1 
protected person. A two-year grace period beginning at 
independence was allowed for all remaining Asians to regis­
ter for Kenyan citizenship. No dual citizenship was 
allowed; but for those Asians not choosing Kenyan citizenship 
the alternative of a British passport was offered. 
No official Kenya Government figures have been 
published on the exact numbers of Asians in the different 
categories. The statistics offered by Noel Mostern in 
Reporter magazine and shown in Table 4 are probably, how­
ever, fairly accurate. The statistics in Table 4 are com­
plicated, however, by the fact that many Asians who were 
granted automatic Kenyan citizenship could have a parent who 
chose to obtain or retain British citizenship. These Kenyan 
citizens could not then be regarded as truly permanent 
citizens. 
^Yash Ghai, "The Future Prospects," in Portrait of 
a Minority? Asians in East Africa, ed. Dharam P. Ghai 
(Nairobi? Oxford University Press, 196$), P» 136. 
61 
TABLE 4 
FIGURES ON ASIAN CITIZENSHIP^ 
Automatic Kenyan Citizens 60,000 
Applications for 
Kenyan Citizenship 1963-65 20,000 
(Applications processed by 
the Kenyan Government) (13,000) 
Balance, i.e» British, Pakistani 
or Indian Citizenship 100,000-120,000 
Total Asians in Kenya at Independence (approx„) 190,000 
^From Noel Mostert, "Slamming the Door on Kenya's 
Asians," Reporter, XXXVIII (April 4, I960), 27. 
^Most sources place the number of Asians in Kenya 
holding British passports at somewhere near the 120,000 
figure» See, for example, Africa Report, XIII, No, 4 
(April 1968), 22; and The New York Times, January 7, 1969, 
p„ 3» At least one estimate, however, was as high as 
150,000» See Newsweek, September 25, 1967, p. 55» 
The Asian group has been frightened since indepen­
dence by the avowed policy of the African government to 
change the political, economic and social structure of 
Kenya. The Kenyatta Government has been significantly 
ambivalent in terming this policy both "Kenyanization 
i.e. the process of putting Kenyan citizens into positions 
of importance, and "Africanization," i.e. the replacement 
of Europeans and Asians regardless of their citizenship 
with Africans.2 
^For a detailed discussion of this policy see 
pp. 68-72 below. 
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The uncertainty of this policy has caused Asians 
to fear a loss or limitation of occupational possibilities 
in Kenya, Thus, within one month after Uhuru, 1,400 Asians 
left civil service posts and the country;^ and the average 
annual rate of departure from 1963 to 1968 was about 7,000 
AsiansDuring 1967, however, the Kenyan Parliament 
passed two acts which stimulated a massive outflux of 
Asians during the early part of 1968» Both measures were 
major steps by the Kenyan Government to Kenyanize the 
c 
private sector of the economy,^ 
The first measure, known as the Immigration Act, 
authorized the Ministry of Labour to establish a Kenyani-
zation of Personnel Bureau, the duty of which is to study 
the position of non-citizens in commerce and industry» 
All non-citizens were required by this act to apply for 
new work permits. The government acknowledged that the 
intent of the Immigration Act was to eventually permit only 
those non-citizens essential for the economy to remain in 
the country» 
The second legislative step, known as the Trade 
License Act, required that all trading activity in Kenya be 
^The New York Times, January 24? 1964, p» 2» 
%ew Republic, March 16, 1968, p» 8» 
^Discussions of the acts can be found in Mostert, 
p, 27, and WCIIK, p» 257. 
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analyzedo The government was authorized, on the basis of 
this analysis, to decide whether having a non-citizen 
trader in a specific area of Kenya was of benefit to the 
country or not. Certain regions, known as General Trading 
Areas, were to be set aside for both citizen and non-
citizen trade activity. Other regions (which will probably 
be enlarged in the future) were to be established for Kenyan 
citizen traders only. 
During the early days of 1968, about 20,000 Asians 
left Kenya to enter Great Britain. The exodus resulted 
partly from fears generated by the economic restrictions 
placed on Asians by the Kenyan Government. But there was 
Asian apprehension, too, that Britain would soon shut off 
the influx of Asian immigrants. The apprehension became 
fact when on February 27, 1968, a combination of Labourites 
and Conservatives^ voted in the face of charges of a com­
promise of British good faith and a broken solemn promise, 
to pass the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. 
This bill restricts Asian immigration into Britain 
from Kenya to a yearly maximum of 1,500 family heads and 
their dependents. The lopsided margin of passage (372 to 
62 with 180 abstentions) reflects the fears of many British 
whites over a growing "coloured population" which stands at 
^Parliamentary opposition was led by the Liberal 
Party. 
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about 2% of the total British population*^ 
The large majority of non-citizen Asians in Kenya 
were thus effectively cut off from entry into Britain by 
this acts Other possible countries of resettlement were, 
moreover, closed at the same time. Both India and Pakis­
tan, the countries of origin for the Asians, and Uganda, a 
neighboring African country with a significant Asian 
minority, refused responsibility for resettling the Asians 
who wished to leave Kenya, India and Pakistan, in addition, 
passed restrictive immigration legislation to coincide with 
the British policy. 
These actions by the Indian and Pakistani Govern­
ments may appear surprising, but both countries have con­
sistently maintained that the question of citizenship for 
Asians in all of East Africa was a British problem»^ The 
reluctance of these countries to accept responsibility for 
Asians in Kenya may stem from fears of setting a precedent 
for Asians in other countries such as Fiji, Mauritius and 
10 Ceylon, In India's case, for example, the number of 
7"News in Brief: Kenya," African Report, XIII, 
No, 4 (April 1968), 22-23, 
%ee Mostert, pp„ 27-28, 
^For a discussion of this policy see Anirudha Gupta, 
"Indians Abroad--in Asia and Africa: The Problem," Africa 
Quarterly, VII (January-March 1968). 
^^See the London Times, February 26, 1968, p. 8, 
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people in Kenya who can trace their ancestry back to India 
amounts to only about 3^ of the total figure of Indians 
living abroad. 
Attitudinal Determinants 
African Attitudes About Asians 
One example of the lack of social scientific data 
on East Africa is in the scarcity of attitudinal surveyso 
Jo Eo Goldthorpe, however, made a survey in 1955 of the 
attitudes of 52 African graduates of Makerere College in 
Kampala J Uganda, which covered among other things the views 
1 2 
of these men toward Asians. Included in the sample group 
were 9 Kenyans, 41 Ugandans and 5 Tanzanians. The sample 
could not, for very obvious reasons, be called representa= 
tive for the whole Kenyan African population, but the 
results are rather revealing indicators of African attitudes. 
Of the 46 graduates who expressed a definite view 
on Asians, only 2 were termed "friendly," 19 of the answers 
were "tolerant or ambivalent" and 25, or 54%, showed 
"hostility," Common opinions were that Asians as super-
visors in government service were uniformly bad ("sarcasticj 
nagging and demanding"), Asians as traders were regarded as 
11See Kondapi, pp. 527-528. 
I^The graduating date for the sample group was the 
mid-1930's. See J. E. Goldthorpe, "An African Elite," The 
British Journal of Sociology, VI, No. 1 (March 1955)« 
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selfish and dishonest, and Asians as progenitors were seen 
as too prolifico On the positive side there was respect 
for Asian skill and industry, and some agreement that 
younger Asians were less race conscious than their elders 
and more likely to make informal social contact» 
Goldthorpe writes: 
Indians /J-OBO Asian_s7 were frequently compared 
with Europeans, the feelings being apparently that 
while some Europeans are in Africa for the benefit 
of Africans all the Indians are there for their own 
ends. "Their coming into the country was treacherous" 
said one member of the sample.'3 
The author's experience in Kenya would tend to 
confirm a general African dislike for Asians* In express­
ing antipathy, the Africans offer both social and economic 
explanations for their attitude. Africans, first, are 
suspicious and resentful over the independent social and 
cultural life of Asians. Informal contacts between the two 
groups are generally restricted to the elites who meet at 
bars. Tom Mboya scornfully labeled this type of contact 
1 h' "cocktail integration."' Otherwise, the typical African-
Asian relationship is buyer-seller or often servant-master. 
^GoldthorpeJ, "An African Elite," p. 46. 
^^Mboya, p. 109° Mboya also made a remark in 1962 
about the rightful place of intermarriage in an integrated 
society. This caused widespread indignation throughout the 
Asian group. One Asian leader wrote to the East African 
Standard that: "Shahs will not give their daughters to 
Patels, and they will not give them to Africans," This 
quotation reveals both racial and caste-sect Asian grouping. 
Quoted in Delf, p. 5» 
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1 5 Educated or semi-educated Africans see the Europeans as 
a source of Kenya's progress, while Asians are viewed as 
foreign competitors. 
Communications between Asians and the vast majority 
of Africans are further limited by the fact that both 
groups must speak kiSwahili, which is a second language for 
each. Asians have, moreover, adopted a habit similar to 
that of the Europeans in utilizing an ungrammatical pidgin 
version of kiSwahili» The imprecise use of this indigenous 
language strikes many Africans as condescending. In two 
years of living in Kenya, the only non-Africans the author 
heard using the Swahili term Bwana (Mr. or Sir) with 
genuine respect when addressing Africans were American and 
other foreign volunteers» 
Asians hold a comparatively and conspicuously rich 
position in Kenya, but this position is not now beyond the 
expectations of many Africans» Africans feel, moreover, 
that Asians have restricted the chances for upward mobility 
by refusing to open their businesses to African partici­
pation. There is also a widespread feeling, finally, that 
Asians have been bleeding Kenya by exporting capital to 
I^The term "educated" is used here in reference to 
a formal or Western-type education. 
^^See Delf, pp. 63-71. 
68 
friends and relatives in India and Pakistan. 
Asian Attitudes About Africans 
The Asian view of Africans is more difficult to 
assess than the reverse African attitude» The colonial 
racial hierarchy put Asians a step above Africans^ and the 
continued habit of that position is evidenced in a common 
Asian rudeness when dealing with Africans» The author had 
the interesting experience of meeting and conversing with 
several Asians in Kenya who assumed by the common relative 
lightness of skins an entente in "enduring" the Africans. 
But the Asians realize that they are living in an 
African country now, and they are apprehensive and uncertain 
about what steps the government will take to rectify the 
inequities of colonialism and bring about a new social and 
economic order. They wonder if it will be a policy of 
Kenyanization, Which will develop new opportunities for 
Kenyan citizens, or Africanization, with a new order based 
on race. They recognize, finally, that the Kenyatta 
Government is being forced between the pressures of needed 
Asian skills on the one side and African political pressure 
on the other. 
17while there is no hard data on this point, authors 
such as Morris (The Indians in Uganda, pp. 134-135) and 
Tandon (p. 122) have discounted any real or significant 
losses to East Africa by Asians removing capital from this 
area. 
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The cross-pressures are seen in official pronounce­
ments such as that of the East African Udoji Commission of 
1963»^^ The Commission listed the following reasons for 
Africanization of the civil service in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania; 
1, For historical reasons; the African Racial 
Group was accorded discriminatory treatment during the 
colonial period, 
2„ For political considerations; the hiring of 
expatriates''^ is embarrassing. 
3» For functional reasons; an indigenous staff is 
more permanent, 
4o For economic reasons; the expatriates are 
expensive, 
5,  For social and long-term motivations; expatriates 
leave with their experience. 
Of these five reasons, only the first applies to 
Asians, and even here the Asians maintain that they, too, 
suffered somewhat in the imbalance of colonialism. The 
Commission goes on to assert, however, that: "Africani­
zation is not merely a policy of equalization, it is also 
^^Report of the Africanization Commission for the 
East African Common Services Organization, quoted in Yash 
Ghai, p, 153o 
^^Expatriates are foreigners, usually whites, 
working in Africa. 
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that all key and policy-advising posts in the Civil Service 
should be held by Africans 
Statements by Kenyan Government officials are rather 
ambiguouso Often the term "Africanization" is used but then 
qualified. The following examples are from speeches by 
President Kenyatta.^^ 
In a House of Representatives speech of July 23» 
1963s he stated: 
It is the policy of the Government to Africanize 
the Civil Service as quickly as we can» But at the 
same time, what we need to remember is not the colour 
of a person's skin, nor anyone's race. We want 
experienced people. Some of these people—-whom ray 
friends regard as imperialists or colonialists-—have 
experience which we need. Until we train our people 
to hold these posts, we cannot—in a day, as soon as 
we achieve Independence—scrap every post and say we 
will put black men in them because they are black. 
In my Government, I want experience, and I do not 
care where I get it. Unless we have a Government 
with capable Officers to run it, then our Government 
will fall. I want the people to understand this: 
that we have this policy of Africanization, that 
people are being trained for various posts, and that 
when they are ready we shall give them responsibility. 
But we cannot take people just because they are 
blacko^Z 
This speech indicates that the Kenyatta Government 
intends to follow a policy of Africanization as soon as 
Africans are capable of assuming responsible positions. 
20page 11 of the Report, quoted in Yash Ghai, p. 140. 
^Ipor a collection of speeches made by Mr. Kenyatta 
during 1963 and 1964 see Jomo Kenyatta, Harambee!. 
^^Kenyatta, Harambee!, p. 110. 
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Yet in the same month, July 1963, Kenyatta spoke in 
a somewhat different vein before a group of Asian business­
men in Mombasa. 
The Gbverhment . , <> is for every citizen of 
Kenya, Irrespective of what race or religion you 
belong to, we will work for you all» » . o We want 
to retain your skills and business experience, and 
wish you to continue to work as you have done in 
the Colonial days.23 
In spite of this benign pose, the President has on 
occasion had tough words for Asians. Thus in a Nairobi 
speech of June 1964 he warned; 
Indians e. Asians/ must learn as well, and 
must adapt themselves to live with our people. 
They must obey the African rule. 
I say that if there are any Asians who are 
unwilling to work with us, they can pack their bags 
and go.24 
And at his residence at Githunguri in September of 
1964 Kenyatta said: 
Speaking as the leader of my Party, I would like 
to pose this question: when we were fighting for free­
dom and human dignity, how many non-Africans died in 
this struggle? The non-Africans must abandon their 
old strategy. They must realize this was consigned 
to the flames, with all other vestiges of imperialism, 
on Independence Day. We do not want such people to 
change their colour. To them I simply say; turn and 
become Africans in your hearts, and we will welcome 
you with open arms.25 
In what is probably one of the most revealing and 
23lbid., pp. 109-110, 
24ibid., p. 110. 
25lbid., p o 109° 
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straightforward statements by an African leader to Asians, 
Tom Mboya spoke the following words before the Kenya 
Indian Congress in July 1962. 
There is no intention to replace present privilege 
with African privilege, but a true Kenyan--irrespective 
of his race or creed--raust be entitled to some privi­
lege in his mother country. In the past the African 
has been underprivileged and therefore in the early 
stages at least, "localization" is bound to give the 
appearance that it is primarily Africanization, and 
indeed by force of numbers it is.26 
Radical statements advocating Africanization have 
been limited thus far to Parliamentary Backbenchers and 
27 labor union spokesmen, but Kenya's Asians wonder how long 
the Kenyatta Government can resist political pressures which 
are directly connected with rising African expectations. 
Economic Factors Affecting 
the Relationship 
The Precarious Economic 
Position of the Asians 
The trend among young Africans in Kenya, as else­
where, is a movement away from rural areas and into the 
cities. This generation of Africans thinks of agriculture 
as undignified and backward. Freedom and indeed civiliza­
tion demand jobs in commerce or, more especially, in public 
service. It is precisely in these commercial and government 
^^Mboya, p. 109« 
Z^Yash Ghai, p. HO. 
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occupations that 60 to IQffo of Asians throughout East Africa 
2 A make their living. The fact that so many Asians are 
working in the choice occupations and so many Africans 
desire these jobs serves to put the Asians in a difficult 
position. Can a push for total Africanization, they 
wonder, be far off? 
Goldthorpe's study of attitudes alluded to an 
African unhappiness over relative Asian affluence. Such 
Asian affluence does not mean, of course, that every 
Asian is rich and all Africans are poor but, rather, that 
Asians are generally richer. This fact is revealed in the 
following statistics. 
1o Although they number around 2% of Kenya's 
population, the Asians' percentage of the national income 
is about 20^.29 
2. The average 1962 cash earnings for Asian males 
in Kenya was E551 (about $1575)» which is about seven times 
that for Africans. 
3. In 1966J Asians controlled of Kenya's 
^^Dharam P. Ghai, pp. 106-108. 
L. Muller, "The Economic Position of the 
Asians in Africa," The South African Journal of Economics, 
XXXIII, Noo 2 (June 1965), 117. —— 
^^Dharam P. Ghai, "An Economic Survey," p. 100. 
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wholesale and retail trade,^^ 
4» A 1967 estimate places Asian holdings in real 
estate, commercial buildings and investments at 75^ of all 
urban property 
Table 5 shows by race the percentage of taxpayers 
in different income brackets for 1962» 
TABLE 5 
INCOME IN KENYA BY RACE (1962}^ 
Arabs and 
Income Group Africans Somalis Asians Europeans 
Under El 20^ 91 ÛSoOf fo  11 oOfo  1 <.5% 
EI2O-EI59 4.7 7.2 4o3 3.2 
EI6O-EI99 1 .7 1 o9 3o3 0.6 
E200-E399 1 »7 2.0 13.0 2.5 
E4OO and over 0.5 2.9 60.4 92.2 
TOTALS WOoOfo  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
^Gupta, p. 307? from the Development Plan of Kenya 
1962-70. Po 34o 
= $2.86. 
The demonstrated Asian economic success is based 
upon what one author has termed their "Quasi-Protestant 
^^Henry Reuter, ̂ You Can't Run a Duka Without 
Hundis /sic7«" New York Times, January 31, 1966, p. 62. 
32Kaplan _et a^. , p. 135° 
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Ethic J" which includes a strong commercial sense, a 
capacity for work, a low propensity to consume and a passion 
for accumulation of capital,^^ Ro C, Thurnwald lists the 
following six reasons for Asian prosperity» 
1. They follow a simple life, a kind of "economic 
asceticism»" 
2o They have a very close knit family life 
arrangement. 
3o They save their money» 
4. There is familial aid among them» 
5o They astutely position themselves on main lines 
of commercial traffic. 
6o They have developed abilities in English, 
readings writing and mathematics. 
Many Europeans and Africans alike have degraded or 
ignored the contribution made by Asians to the development 
of the Kenya economy. But the opening up of a monetary 
economy in several sections of the country and the avail­
ability of skilled manpower and capital necessary for eco­
nomic expansion have resulted from the Asian presence. 
The East Africa Royal Commission Report (Cmd 9475? 1955) 
^^Dharam P. Ghai, "An Economic Survey," p. 103» 
^^Thurnwald, p. 2^3o 
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3 5 clearly enunciated the Asian contributiono 
The growth of modern commerce in East Africa has 
been almost entirely due to the activities of non-
African members of the population and in particular 
to the Indian e. Asian/, Arab and Goan traders and 
to the large European firms with their trade connexions 
in the western world» Indeed, the remarkable tenacity 
and courage of the Indian trader has been mainly 
responsible for stimulating the wants of the indigenous 
peoples even in the remotest areas, by opening them to 
a shop window on the modern world and for collecting 
for sale whatever small surpluses are available for 
disposalo 
And again: 
A new and emergent people cannot, in a short 
period acquire the technical skills and organizing 
capacity which other older people have acquired only 
after long periods of tradition and experience» » o o 
The knowledge and experience which suitable immi­
grants can bring to East Africa are assets with which 
it is impossible to disperse with in any foreseeable 
future. 
Estimates made in 1962 on skilled manpower in East 
Africa show about iSjOOO professional men of graduate or 
equivalent level, senior administrators and senior managers 
in industry and commerce. Of this totalj Asians account 
for 40^. A second estimate on technicians and sub-
professional grades, executive grades in civil service, 
middle management in industry and commerce, and teachers 
with secondary education but not degrees puts their 
number at about 49,500 men of which Asians make up 
35Quoted in Goldthorpe, Outlines of East African 
, p o 112. 
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These figures would support the argument that the 
Asians are needed in Kenya» It is equally apparent that 
their presence tends to develop new economic opportunities, 
for the Asians lend aid both in the contribution of man­
power needed for development and in the example they set 
of successful business methods. Yet pressures against the 
Asian group have continued to mount since independence» 
Some authors are optimistic that given economic 
growth the pressures will subside. Thus Bert F. HoselitZj, 
writing about all immigrant minorities in newly independent 
nations, comments? 
. . .  a s  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  a c h i e v e  p o l i t i c a l  i n d e ­
pendence and take moderately successful steps 
toward modernizationj, economic growth will improve 
the social and economic position of the indigenous 
people. More than any other factor, this tends to 
make possible the integration of foreign ethnic 
minorities into the social structure of newly 
developing countries. Some phases of the integra­
tion of ethnic minorities may be complex and diffi­
cult, however, leading to violence or other forms of 
social conflict. But in the long run ethnic "dualism" 
will disappear as a structurally more simplified and 
^ The two categories of skilled manpower and the 
population estimates come from Guy Hunter, The New Societies 
of Tropical Africa (London; Oxford University Press, 1962), 
and are quoted in Dharam P. Ghai, "An Economic Survey," 
p. 102. While figures for Kenya per se are not available, 
the Asian percentage of skilled manpower is probably much 
higher for that country alone than the figure for all of 
East Africa. Approximately one-half of all the Asians in 
East Africa reside in Kenya. The total population for East 
Africa in 1962 was about 24,500,000. This puts the combined 
skilled manpower figures at .28% of the total. 
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better integrated society emerges 
Social and economic facts^ in Kenya at least, do 
not support Mr. Hoselitz' optimism, however» Granted, 
much does depend on the growth of Kenya's economy, and the 
record thus far is good. But two other equally important 
factors are involved* First, economic growth does not 
necessarily mean equitable distribution of the fruit of 
that growth. Many observers are highly critical of Kenya's 
3 S 
lack of progress is achieving a just distribution. 
Second, the process of economic growth and development is 
intricately coupled with a parallel process of rising eco­
nomic and social expectations.^^ As the idea for economic 
advancement is pushed in Kenya, many Africans--some for the 
first time--become aware of their own relative poverty. 
One direct result of this new and profound sense of poverty 
is friction between poorer Kenyans and richer outside 
national groups, and between poor Africans in Kenya and 
richer internal social groups--both Asians and Africans. 
^^Bert F. Hoselitz, "Interaction Between Industrial 
and Pre-Industrial Stratification Systems," in Social 
Structure and Mobility in Economic Development,, ed. Neil J. 
Smelser and Seymour Martin Lipset (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), 
p. 191. 
^^See pp. 53-5# above. 
^^This idea will be more fully amplified in rela­
tion to the stresses which it places on tribal relations. 
See pp. 101-106 below. 
79 
The Asian Economic Response 
The Asian response to hostile African attitudes and 
increased governmental restrictions on Asian economic 
activity is, as has been mentioned, one of ambivalence., 
Asians are caught between an emotional attachment to Kenya 
as their home and a rational assessment of their position 
as a small immigrant minority marked by wealth and color in 
a newly independent nation seeking to bring about socio­
economic change» The whole thought, moreover, of making a 
meaningful economic response to the increased economic 
restrictions by opening Asian businesses to a significant 
African participation is most disturbingo The thought works 
against natural non-altruistic business inclinations among 
the Asianso Africans are regarded as economic risks, since 
most cannot contribute capital 5, experience or skill to any 
joint business venture. For small Asian businesses there 
is a final added factor in that most of these ventures are 
family enterprises, a combined socio-economic activity into 
which Africans would not easily or happily fit» 
Alternative job opportunities are quite limited. 
Asians must seek occupations which Africans find inaccessible 
by reason of the necessary qualifications or outright 
undesirability. Agriculture must also be largely excluded 
because of an understandable African reluctance to sell land 
to non-citizens. Some Asians are hoping to initiate or 
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expand wholesale trade operations This hope by the very 
limitations of the Kenyan economy, however, must be 
restricted to a minority of the Asian group. 
Educational Complications: The Possibility 
for an Educational Response 
The quality of Asian education in Kenya has been 
adversely affected by several factors. First, colonial 
administrators discriminated on a racial basis against both 
African and Asian educational programs. Second, the Asian 
caste-sect group division limited the resources that Asians 
might contribute to their own educational advancement. The 
financial assets and trained personnel needed to build and 
staff schools were not combined in any united Asian effort 
to promote high-quality education. 
A study made by A. A. Kazimi in 1947 on Asian 
education in East Africa^^ revealed these common problems 
in the Asian schools: 
1. Facilities were severely overcrowded. 
2. Teachers were poorly qualified. In Kenya, only 
one-third of the teachers in government-run schools for 
^^See Delf, p. 46; and Hunter, p. 1$6. 
^"'Raymond Gold, "The Educational Systems of East 
Africa" (unpublished manuscript; Missoula, Montana, 1969). 
^^This study is quoted in P. M. Rattansi and 
M. Abdulla, "An Educational Survey," in Portrait of a 
Minority, ed. Dharam P. Ghai, pp. 117-11°^"! 
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Asians had degrees or qualifications» In the private 
schools only 54 teachers of a total of 213 were college 
matriculates « 
3o Courses were too literary. Kazimi found too 
great an emphasis on the passage of the Cambridge School 
Certificate examination and too little emphasis placed on 
useful technical education. 
4o There were few opportunities for higher educa­
tion. 
Under the Colonial Government in Kenya the whole 
system of education was racially segregated, including 
separate government administrative sections,, syllabusesj 
comprehensive examinations and school facilities. 
Government expenditures for education for this 
period were, moreoverj racially discriminatory. The 1955 
public appropriation for each European student was EÔ5 
(about $245.00); for each Asian student E21 (about $60.00) 
and for each African student E6 (about $17o00).^^ Under 
the Kenya Development Programme of 1957-1960; Europeans 
(1% of the population) received 19% of the education budget 
funds; Asians (3% of the population) received 28% of the 
funds; and Africans (96% of the population) received 53% 
of the funds. Such discrimination was compounded by the 
43see Gold. 
^^Delf, p. 44c 
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fact that Asians and Africans were, of course, the two 
racial groups least able to counterbalance insufficient 
public funding by their own private means. The Asians tried 
to take up the financial slack through caste-sect schools<> 
In i960, only one-third of the Asian schools were govern­
ment run, while one-third were partially aided and one-
third were totally private.^5 The effect on the quality 
of Asian schools by the inadequacy of this approach is 
documented in the unhappy conclusions of the Kazimi Reporto 
Asians now see some hope in the non-racial and 
integrated school system established since Uhuru. Not only 
do they realize that the future quality of Asian-African 
relations lies with the Asian youth, but they also desire 
to see better relations develop between the youngsters of 
both races through contacts in schools. There are increased 
contacts, too, between Asian teachers and African students. 
This latter relationship may well impress Africans as a 
demonstration of Asian willingness to participate in the 
development of an African country where education is highly 
prized. 
Asians recognize that the key to adjustment to 
programs of Africanization lies in developing the abilities 
through education to fill Kenya's skilled and professional 
manpower requirements. 
45ibid. 
Ô3 
But while Asians hold hopes for social and economic 
advantages in the post-independence school system^ they 
realize that the government is intent upon reversing the 
inequities of colonial educational policies» This reali­
zation causes apprehension among Asians, because there is 
uncertainty over what future tack the Kenyan Government will 
take toward the education of Asian youngsters.Funds may 
be cut, for example, for Asian-run schools which are par­
tially supported by public grants. Some Asians feel that 
caste-sect schools will need to expand to furnish new oppor­
tunities for Asian students and to provide insurance against 
possible government discriminationo 
The caste-sect groups, however, have only limited 
resources to contribute. The real hope for Asian education 
in Kenya and elsewhere lies with the African governments. 
P. M. Rattans! and Me Abdulla conclude in their survey of 
Asian education in East Africa that: 
The control of education is primarily in the 
hands of the governments, and in this sense the 
future of the Asians is also in the hands of the 
governments 0 If the governments adopt policies which 
discriminate against the Asian school children and 
effectively reduce their opportunities for education, 
the future for the Asians will be terribly bleak,47 
4&See Rattansi and Abdulla, pp. 125-126. 
47lbid,, p. 124. The governments referred to here 
are, of course, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 
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The Problems and Prospects for Asian 
Political Participation 
o o o if the Asians can integrate effectively at the 
political level; then many of their social and eco­
nomic problems will be dealt with more sympatheti­
cally and successfully.48 
This statement by an Asian author demonstrates a 
recognition of opportunities flowing from political inte­
gration or participation. But there are both historical 
legacies and contemporary difficulties which may prevent 
such effective political integration. 
The historical contribution of the Asians to the 
achievement of Kenya's independence was minimal, and 
Africans are aware of this fact. The Asian-European con­
flict during the colonial period was for Asians an anti-
European rather than a pro-African effort. The restraint 
which this conflict put on the Europeans was beneficial, 
of course, to the African cause of independence. But every­
one in Kenya knows that most Asians did not have African 
interests in mind when they struggled with the Europeans, 
George Delf makes the point that Asians were prob­
ably surprised by the early achievement of uhuru in Kenya.^9 
Such surprise is understandable, for many observers both 
inside Kenya and out did not expect Kenya's rapid movement 
^%ash Ghai, p, 143. 
^^Delf, pp, vii-ix. 
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50 toward self-government during the late 1950's» But 
Asian uninvolvement in the promotion of this movement runs 
deeper than mere surprise. The Asians were a relatively 
privileged group in the colony and were naturally unwilling 
to jeopardize this privilege by supporting rule by the 
Africans who, under the colonial system, had not been 
allowed to develop or to demonstrate either intellectual or 
political leadership, 
Asians were hindered, also, in the formation of a 
coherent policy with respect to uhuru by their caste-sect 
divisions. This divisiveness, mentioned before in terms 
of caste-sect group political activity and the weakness of 
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the EAINC, has plagued Asian political activity throughout 
Kenya's history. 
George Bennett and Carl G, Rosberg in their book 
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on the 1961 elections in Kenya write of the political dis­
unity among Asians, a phenomenon they terra "political 
communalism." 
However much leaders may proclaim that it must 
and should end, all Asian elections in Kenya in the 
50As expressed to this author, the typical settler 
reaction to the rapid achievement of independence in Kenya 
was one of great surprise and a feeling that the British 
Government had betrayed European interests there. 
See po 14 and pp. 39-40 above, 
52G@orge Bennett and Carl G, Rosberg, The Kenvatta 
Election: Kenya 1960-1961 (London: Oxford University 
tress, 1961), 
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past--and this was no exception—have been dominated 
by communalism. The first document noticed on many 
an Asian candidate's desk, and the first subject of 
conversation with the agent of any candidate, was 
the breakdown of the voters' role by communities» 
Muslim and non-Muslim candidates alike knew that their 
first task was to seek and obtain support from the 
leaders of the various groups: Patels, Shahs, Punjabi 
Hindus, Sikhs, Goans, etc. on the non-Muslim side, 
with, on the Muslim, Sunnis, Ismailis, Bohras, Menonsj 
Ithnasharis, etco53 
All of these factors, then—surprise, fear and 
disunity—contributed to Asian inability to assist uhuru. 
These factors also help to explain the Asian failure to 
follow strong exhortations by Prime Minister Nehru and 
other Indian and Pakistani leaders to East African Asians 
to support anti-colonialist movements. 
The ability of the Asians to participate effectively 
in the Kenyan political system since independence has also 
been limited by several factors. Emigration has meant a 
decline in numbers and political strength; Asians are now 
53Bennett and Rosberg, p» 11$. 
5^A final possibility for Asian inaction is offered 
by Tom Mboya who wrote that he believed the Asian leaders 
had "betrayed the interests of their people in not support­
ing Uhuru vigorously."' Mboya felt that: "The overwhelming 
majority of the Indian Asian7 community in Kenya sup­
ported the African s tana and want"id to adhere to the 
standards set by Nehru and Gandhi as friends and allies in 
the struggle for freedom and democracy" (Mboya, p. 10). 
Mboya's belief is difficult to assess in that this author 
found nothing to support this position, but rather observed 
marked Asian-African differences which would obviously tend 
to discount such "overwhelming" Asian sympathy for indepen­
dence. Mboya had, however, both the insight and experience 
to validate his position. 
a? 
divided by a new citizen - non-citizen cleavage; and, 
finally, African majority rule has limited the range of 
political options open to Asians. This limited range of 
options results from the fact that aspiring Asian poli­
ticians have become more dependent on the support of 
African voters and less able to appear to champion Asian 
causes. 
The Asian dependence on African voters would be 
lessened if a one-party system were to develop in Kenya. 
Indeed, there may be much hope for Asians in the develop­
ment of such a system. If the Asians were to become a 
strong supporting faction in a dominant party, they might 
have a much better opportunity to influence government 
policies. Their participation in such a party would prob­
ably, moreover, be welcomed. There is a realization among 
top African leaders of the significant Asian contribution 
to the Kenyan economy. This realization is not shared 
with the African masses who see Asians as obstacles to their 
own economic progress. In a dominant one-party government 
in Kenya, Asian political participation would not be subject 
to the approval of the African masses in the role of voters 
to such a degree as it is now. 
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The Asian-African Conflict; 
Functions and Risks 
Whether the Kenyatta Government consciously pur­
sues the consequences or not, certain sequels, both 
functional and risky, have resulted from the governmental 
pressures and the maintenance of the Asian-African conflict 
as a national issue. The functional consequences go beyond 
the expressed intent of the Government to eliminate colonial 
inequities which restricted African socio-economic develop­
ment, Desirable consequences (in the Government's view) 
from continued Asian-African strife include the following; 
1o A promotion of cross-tribal African group 
unity. Sociologist Lewis A, Goser writes; 
Conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity 
and boundary lines of societies and group. 
Conflict with other groups contributes to the 
establishment and reaffirmation of the identity of a 
group and maintains its boundaries against the sur­
rounding social world.55 
2, A safety valve for African frustrations prompted 
by limited economic and social gains in the face of rising 
expectations. Asians can easily be made the scapegoats for 
the unmet expectations. 
3, An indebtedness to the government by new 
African businessmen who have, with official aid, moved into 
economic positions formerly held by Asians. 
55coser, p, 38, 
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The risks entangled in the Asian-African conflict 
go beyond the obvious danger of an economic loss if 
talented and productive Asians were to move out of Kenya 
en masse» Three risks involved by placing too much pressure 
on the Asians includes 
1o Possible violence by Africans against the 
Asians. 
2. A decreased incentive for the Kenyatta Govern­
ment to fulfill the pledges of African Socialism. When the 
Asians are made economic scapegoats, the focus is taken off 
policy failures in, for example, the program of equitable 
distribution. 
3. The establishment of a dangerous policy precedent 
for heavy-handed government action towards a minority group 
in Kenya, The legacy of colonial rule in Kenya, as in the 
remainder of Africa, has been described by Victor C. Ferkiss 
as habituation to centralized, undemocratic political 
rule,"5& If the Kenyatta Government deals harshly with 
Asians and, more especially, if the mistreated Asians 
include Kenyan citizens, the "habituation" of unrestricted 
political rule will be extended and intensified. If such 
a precedent is established, there is little reason to 
believe that target of such treatment could not one day be 
one of the African tribes, 
^^Ferkiss; p. 7â, 
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Summary 
In this chapter the author has endeavored to 
analyze the current Asian-African relationship in Kenya, 
Cross-racial attitudes were described, and an account was 
given of the increasing political and economic pressures 
placed on the Asian group by official actions in Great 
Britain, India, Pakistan and Kenya. The governmental 
pressures have generated Asian hopes to respond, and these 
hopes were analyzed by describing possible economic, 
educational and political adaptations open to the Asians, 
The chapter then concluded with a description of possible 
and probable results of recent Kenyan Government policies 
toward the Asians, 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN TRIBAL 
RELATIONSHIPS 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in some 
detail the complexities of current African tribal relation­
ships. In the plural society of Kenya, the quality of 
relationships within the dominant African group will have 
a profound effect on the as yet uncertain achievement of a 
stable and viable political system. 
The Crucial Question of National Unity 
The morning after independence has brought a 
^shock of recognition" of fragile underpinnings. 
Building a new nation is a rough, unchartered 
journey with many unanticipated problems.1 
The most crucial social question in Kenya today is 
whether or not the country can hang together. The dynamics 
of the problem lie within the great African majority and the 
relationship of the primordial tribal groups. Will 
^Lester G. Seligman, "Political Mobility and 
Economic Development," in Smelser and Martin (eds.), 
Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, 
p. 340. 
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tribalism, the conflict of these tribal groupsdestroy 
the unity of Kenya? 
While sporadic cross-tribal violence broke out 
soon after independence in 1963, the first serious blow to 
African national unity came when Vice President Oginga 
Odinga withdrew from the government in April 1966»^ Shortly 
thereafter, Odinga and several other members of Parliament 
formed the Kenya People's Union (KPU). The basis for the 
KPU was primarily tribal in nature, for most of the leaders 
including Odinga are Luos and the party is strongest in the 
western area of Kenya around Lake Nyanza (Victoria) where 
the Luos predominate. 
A second setback for post-independence African 
unity came on July 5, 1969, with the assassination of 
Mr. Tom Mboya, the Minister for Economic Affairs and 
Secretary-General of KANU. Mboya was an important and 
^"Tribalism," as it is used here, is only one of 
several definitions of the term» Tribalism has also been 
used to refer to "traditionalism" or "cultural conserva­
tism" and to "ruralism" as opposed to "urbanism." For a 
discussion of this multiple usage see Pierre L» van den 
Berghe, "Introduction," in Africa: Social Problems of 
Change and Conflict, ed, Pierre L, van den Berghe 
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965), p. 440. 
^Fighting was reported in July 1964 along the Rift 
Valley and Western Region boundaries which left 1,200 home­
less, one dead and several injured. The New York Times, 
July 22, 1964, p. 21, Oginga Odinga describes the same 
incident in his book Not Yet Uhuru as being between the 
Maragoli and Nyangori tribal groups. 
^See Odinga, especially pp. 275-315« 
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perhaps essential agent in the maintenance of cross-tribal 
unity in Kenya under the Kenyatta Government. For although 
he was a Luo, Mboya was a strong voice in Kenyatta's cabi­
net and party. He had personally built for himself a 
multitribal backing that he demonstrated by his election to 
Parliament from a predominantly Kikuyu constituency. Mboya 
was commonly recognized, moreover, as having great economic 
and political planning ability.5 His murder (by a Kikuyu) 
brought to the surface violent tribal conflict. 
The violence was in evidence as President Kenyatta's 
car was stoned by Luos as he attended funeral ceremonies for 
Mboya in Nairobi. A similar stoning occurred later in the 
year when Kenyatta visited Mboya's home area in Nyanza 
Province. In the second incident, police protecting 
Kenyatta opened fire on the attacking crowd, killing 11 and 
injuring 70.^ Given the strong charismatic nature of 
Kenyatta, these violent attacks represent a dramatic break­
down in tribal relations. Mzee himself was reportedly 
extremely shaken by the experiences and began to initiate 
a practice of oathing by fellow Kikuyus. The oaths, which 
invoked memories of the Mau Mau days, were supposedly 
pledges by the Kikuyu to seek or keep control of Kenya in 
^See John Hatch, "Kenya After Mboya," New Statesman, 
LXXVIII, No, 2000 (July 11, 1969). 
%ewsweek, November 10, 1969, p. 8. 
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7 their own hands» 
Masinde Mulurio, an M.P. and leader in the Abaluhya 
tribe, Kenya's third largest, commented in Parliament in 
August that "the whole country felt unsafe and was asking 
d 
what the Kikuyu were doing," By October 1969, The New York 
Times reported that; "Church sources with wide acquaintance 
in Kikuyuland report that 90^ of the tribe's members have 
Q 
taken part in the illegal ceremonies." 
The news emanating from Kenya in late 1969 told of 
increasing tribal conflict.The prospect that President 
Kenyatta could hold the country together without resorting 
to force was increasingly diminished as he lost cross-tribal 
11 
appeal. 
W, Apple Jr.; "Tribal Emotions Deepen in 
Kenya," The New York Times, August 20, 1969, p® 11» Some 
reports had oathing ceremonies at Kenyatta's private resi­
dence at Gatundu. See R. W, Apple Jr., "Kenyatta Fading 
As Unity Symbol in Wave of Tribalism," The New York Times. 
October 13> 1969» p» 8, 
^Apple, "Tribal Emotions Deepen in Kenya," 
p. 11. 
^Apple, "Kenyatta Fading As Unity Symbol," p. 8. 
"'Members of the Kipsigis tribe, for example, were 
said to have forced out all Kikuyu living near the Kip­
sigis home area around Kericho, 
llSee Apple, "Kenyatta Fading As Unity Symbol," 
p. 8, 
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Historical Background to Contemporary 
Relationships 
Tribal conflict has probably existed to some degree 
in Kenya ever since the ancestors of the modern tribes came 
1 9 
into contact—about 500 years ago» Some authors believe 
that early tribal relationships, although mistrustful or 
1 3 even hostile, were characterized by little violence. This 
assertion cannot be proven with any certainty, but it is 
known, however, that in the early 19th Century conflict 
between tribes grew. This friction probably resulted from 
the pressures of overpopulation and the aid given by some 
Africans to Arab and Portuguese slavers. 
British entry into Kenya, although it brought an 
end to slavery, eventually created a new division between 
African tribes which has current significance» The British 
brought to Africa as part of the "white man's burden" the 
"Western Way," which introduced individualism, science, 
technology and the desire to accumulate wealth. The 
African response to the Western Way was not uniform. The 
Kikuyu, for example, quickly adopted and adapted the new 
way to their traditional behavior, Paul Bohannan terms the 
I^See pp. 24-25, 
Colin M. Turnbull, The Lonely African 
(New York: Simon and Schuster ̂ 1 '96217 esp©ciaIly" p. 245, 
and Davidson, p, 168, 
''%ee Davidson, 
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modern Kikuyu a '^driven people" who act much like 18th or 
19th Century capitalists with goals of "greater achieve­
ment, wealth and ease^ James Coleman attributes the 
Kikuyu response partly to certain traditional culture 
traits such as a "general absence of chiefs, smallness in 
scale and the democratic character of indigenous political 
organization, /and7 emphasis on achieved status and indivi­
dualism," all of which parallels similar traits among the 
Ibo people of eastern Nigeria. 
In general, it may be said that Peasant tribes such 
17 as the Kikuyu more quickly and readily adopted the Western 
Way than did Pastoral tribes such as the Masai, Turkana or 
Galla. The Pastorals have resisted change for several 
1 A reasons, 
1. Traditional special work functions among the 
Pastorals have somewhat inhibited work activities in a 
modern economy. 
2o Pastorals have a traditional aristocratic 
I^Bohannan, pp. 27-28. 
l6james S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical 
Africa," The American Political Science Review. XLVIII, 
No. 2 (June 1954), 413. 
^^See Thurnwald's Peasant-Pastoral divisions on 
p. 15 and Table 3 above. 
I^for a discussion of this resistance see Thurn-
wald, p. 102. 
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self-opinion which was approbated during British rule. 
3. There is a continuing attraction to the 
traditional ways among the Pastorals because it was through 
this traditional manner of life that they had acquired 
power and prestige during precolonial days. 
As African reaction to the Western Way was uneven, 
so too was their reaction to British rule. Dr. Gikonyo 
Kiano, Kenya's Minister for Education, remarked before 
Uhuru that; "The desire to be rid of the colonial govern­
ment is the nearest thing we have to 'one-ness' or to being 
a nation.This statement, while true, must be qualified 
with the fact that even in the anti-colonial struggle there 
was not total African unity; for that struggle was in great 
part a Kikuyu struggle. As Coleman writes: "In Kenya, 
Mau Mau and all earlier proto-nationalist movements have 
been predominantly Kikuyu endeavors, even though the name 
20 
Kenya has been employed." 
Current African Relationships 
Despite official government avoidance of the term 
"tribe," the tribal social group carried over into the 
period since independence. This persistence may be 
I^Quoted in Susan Wood, Kenya; The Tensions of 
Progress (London; Oxford University Press, 1960), p. T7. 
^Ocoleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," 
p. 421. 
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explained in part by general theory on the nature of social 
groups. Thus Abner Cohen writes: 
. . o traditional groups are highly tenacious in the 
face of change. And when their members are held 
together not only by common customs and values but 
also by vital economic and political interests, these 
groups struggle hard to retain their autonomy.21 
Lester G. Seligman says much the same in his comment on pri­
mordial group reaction to the phenomenon of nationalism: 
o o o the new nationalism itself stimulates and 
reinforces the old parochial loyalties. In many 
instances traditional groups become more appre­
hensive and militant about preserving their own 
identity and status.22 
Tom Mboya offers an explanation for continued con­
flict or tribalism in writing: 
When a leader feels himself weak on the 
national platform he begins to calculate that the 
only support he may have will come from his own 
tribe; so he starts to create an antagonism of 
this sort; to entrench himself as at least a 
leader of his tribe.23 
Mboya's point here is that the persistent strength of the 
tribal unit and the incidence of cross-tribal hostility may 
be deliberately manipulated from above. Thus tribal 
Abner Cohen, "The Politics of Mysticism in Some 
Local Communities in Newly Independent African States," in 
Local Level Politics, ed. Marc J. Swartz (Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Co., 1968) , p. 362. John C„ Calhoun wrote suc­
cinctly for another place and age that: "Self-preserva­
tion is the supreme law, as well with communities as indi­
viduals," John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government 
(New York: Poli Sci Classics^ 1947)> p. 10. 
22Lester G. Seligman, p. 345. 
23Mboya, p. 66. 
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identity and strife may be promoted by both the calculated 
effort of leaders and the spontaneous tribal group reaction 
to social change. 
Whatever the explanations, tribalism is a commonly 
acknowledged fact of the Kenyan society today. Since 1963? 
the Kikuyu, as members of the most educated and "modern" 
of the tribal groups, have fallen heir to government busi­
ness and agricultural positions vacated by the departing 
British. The extent of this take-over is difficult to 
document, but what is evident is a widespread resentment 
among other Africans at what they consider to be tribal 
favoritism in job hiring and farm and business establishment 
purchase. For example, a recent poll cited in a book 
written in 196? showed that 63% of the Kenyan people felt 
that tribal favoritism existed in the Kenyan civil service. 
Additional evidence of tribalism in Kenya today can 
be found in stereotype comments which Africans make about 
other tribes. The author heard many such comments, usually 
^John S. Roberts, A Land Full of People: Life in 
Kenya Today (New York; Praeger, 1967), p. 63. What 
Roberts did not reveal, unfortunately, was a tribal break­
down, if one existed, of this 68^. It would have been 
interesting to see, for example, how many Kikuyu were 
included among this category. 
The author remembers many incidents in which 
Africans spoke of favoritism for Kikuyu, One young Nandi 
government farm administrator, for example, said with 
bitterness but resignation that he had been in line for a 
promotion but was passed over through such favoritism for 
a Kikuyu subordinate. 
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phrased as well-intentioned admonishments for the uniniti­
ated foreigner. Thus in reference to the Kikuyu one hears: 
"Don't marry a Kikuyu; she'll run away and steal all your 
money and children." Another common statement about the 
Kikuyu is; "Don't enter into any business agreements with 
the Kikuyu; they'll cheat you." The assumption of such 
statements is that the Kikuyu (who are called "Kukes" by 
some urban Africans) are dishonest. 
Comments about the Masai and other more traditional 
tribes by more "educated" or urbanized Africans show an 
assumption that the traditional tribes are backward or 
savage. Thus the author has been told: "I pity you living 
with the Masai; you'd be better off with some 'civilized' 
Africans." 
Many Africans, in talking about the Luo people, 
reveal their feeling that all Luos are unclean. This idea 
stems from the fact that the Luos, unlike the members of 
almost every other major tribe in Kenya, perform neither 
male nor female circumcision,^^ Thus one hears the com­
ment; "Never marry a Luo; they're a dirty lot," 
^^Another major exception is the Turkana tribe. 
Female circumcision, or clitoridectomy, is probably much 
less common in Kenya today than it was before the arrival 
of the British, 
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The Possibility and Implications of the 
Emergence of Classes in Kenya 
In an earlier section, the possibility was discussed 
of the emergence of classes in Kenya as a result of govern­
ment failures to implement the distributive aspect of 
African Socialism.The relevance of such an emergence to 
the current Asian-African conflict has also been examined 
But growing economic and social differences between Africans 
have implications, also, for current African tribal rela­
tions . 
Several authors have examined the widespread desire 
for a better quality of life which emerged in colonial 
p 
areas after World War II. This desire, often termed the 
"revolution of rising expectations," has not been limited to 
a yearning for consumer goods, but has included aspirations 
of education for oneself and one's children, improved health, 
and opportunities for new acquaintances, skills and 
respect. 
^^See pp. 53-5^ above. 
27see pp. 77-7# above, 
^%ee especially the works of : Vera Micheles Dean, 
The Nature of the Non-Western World (New York: Mentor 
Books, 1966); Barbara Ward, The Kjch Nations and the Poor 
Nations (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962); and Max F. 
Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer (eds.), The Emerging 
Nations (Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1961). 
29Millikan and Blackmer, pp. 43-44» 
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In addition to its material, non-material aspects, 
the concept of rising expectations is further complicated 
by the fact that the desires are aggravated by a growing 
realization of poverty in relation to other richer men. 
Before the arrival of Asians and Europeans in Kenya, the 
Africans there did not feel relatively poor or deprived. 
The tribes in Kenya, as elsewhere in Africa, were on a 
relatively equal level of development» Even within the 
tribes, economic class distinctions were absent. In the 
subsistence economy only rudimentary differentiations of 
labor existed. Wealth, even if accumulated, was consumed 
rather than stored; the status divisions were based on sex, 
age and demonstrated leadership ability rather than 
wealth. 
Africans have become aware of their relative depri­
vation through personal contacts with foreigners and the 
spread of mass communications. But following independence, 
new meaning has been lent to the sense of deprivation by 
^Ogee Paul Bohannan, p. 24. 
3''See M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, African 
Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press" 1940). 
For studies dealing specifically with Kenya's tribes see; 
Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya; G. W. B. Huntingford, The 
Nandi of Kenya; Tribal Control in a Pastoral Society 
(London; Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953); J « B„ Peris-
tainy. The Social Institutions of the Kipsigis (New York; 
The Humanities Press, 1939; and the novel by James Ngugi, 
The River Between (London; Heinemann, 1965). 
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growing socio-economic divisions within the African racial 
group itself. Initially, distinctions of wealth between 
Africans probably did not create hostility; on the contrary, 
poorer Africans must have felt pride in observing that 
other Africans could succeed in the new system of the 
Western Way. As time goes on, however, as lines become 
more clearly drawn between rich and poor, the sense of 
deprivation must surely grow and class conflict will begin. 
African Overconfidence 
Before Independence 
Africans believed, prior to independence, that such 
class conflict could be avoided once Kenya gained uhuruo 
They knew, of course, that class conflict had not been a 
part of the traditional tribal societies. Many Africans 
were very optimistic, too, that Kenya would be able to 
satisfy the new expectations once the Europeans left. Thus 
the feeling among Kenya's Africans was that an independent 
government could, by combining traditional classless values 
with the profitability of running one's own country, avoid 
a society of African classes after Uhuru, This feeling lies 
at the root of African Socialism, 
The African optimism preceding independence was a 
phenomenon not limited to Kenya, Such optimism was in 
evidence in several African colonies. The more informed 
Africans felt that the colonists had reaped huge profits in 
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Africa and that independence would make these profits 
available for distribution to the inhabitants of the 
former colonies. 
Among the African masses economic anticipations 
were more fanciful than among the more informed. Thus 
Oginga Odinga writes: 
Some people thought that independence meant 
the end of the struggle and all would be in order 
in a new Kenya. Some people in the villages 
thought that there was lots of money in the bank 
and Kenya would give it all to us, that money 
could be printed easily enough,33 
Now, several years after independence, the hard 
realistic facts which make economic development an arduous 
task are being recognized by the African governments. The 
new nations are facing difficulties in finding the capital 
and developing the skills, energy and initiative necessary 
for development.^^ 
The Connection Between 
Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy 
The challenge of surmounting economic difficulties 
and of meeting rising expectations is of crucial importance 
for Kenya and the other newly independent societies of the 
3^See Ferkiss, pp. 74-75. 
33odinga, p. 242. 
3^See Hunter; also Robert L. Heilbroner, The Great 
Ascent (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 19d3T"^ 
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w o r l d , T o  f a i l  w o u l d  b e  t o  j e o p a r d i z e  t h e  v e r y  l e g i t i ­
macy of the new governments. Max Weber has identified 
three approaches by which an authority may gain legitimacy. 
These are: 
1. Through tradition. 
2. Through charismatic appeal, 
3. Through rational legal authority. 
The newly independent Kenyatta Government had, of 
course, precious little tradition upon which to rely. Neve 
before had other tribes experienced leadership by a Kikuyu, 
The charismatic method of gaining legitimacy is dependent 
upon Kenyatta's ability to maintain and develop his image 
in Kenya's plural society as Mzee, the "Father of Kenya," 
35see the writings of: Lester G. Seligman; Martin 
Kilson, "African Political Change and the Modernization 
Process," Journal of Modern African Studies, I (1963); 
Coser; Hunter; and especially Edward Shils, "The Military 
in the Political Development of the New States," in The 
Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed, 
John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J,; Princeton University 
Press, 1962); Edward Shils, Political Development in the 
New States ('s-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co,, 1962); and 
Edward Shils, "On the Comparative Study of the New States, 
in Old Societies and New States; The Quest for Modernity 
in Asia and Africa, ed, Clifford Geertz (New York; The 
Free Press, 1963), 
^^For a discussion of these approaches see Seymour 
Martin Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Basic 
Books Inc., 1963), especially p, f?® 
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37 and indeed on his ability at an old age to continue 
living. The third method of gaining legitimacy, through 
rational legal authority, hinges on a government's ability 
to demonstrate its effectiveness. If it is true that "for 
the new nations today, demonstrating effectiveness means 
one thing, economic development,then this third method 
of gaining legitimacy is dependent on economic development. 
The proof of economic development, for the people of Kenya 
and the other new nations, will be found in the satisfac­
tion of rising expectations. This fact is what makes the 
fulfillment of the expectations so crucially important for 
Kenya. 
The Danger in the Correlation of Class 
with Tribe 
The importance of rising expectations and emerging 
classes in Kenya has great relevance for the relationship 
of the African tribes. If a correlation begins to develop 
between emerging classes and traditional tribal groups, 
then a dangerous threat will also develop for African unity 
and harmony. Even in old established societies such as 
those of the United States and Northern Ireland the coinci­
dence of primordial distinctions of race or religion with 
^^Kenyatta was born in I89O. The World Almanac 
( 1970 Edition), ed. Luman H. Long (New York: Newspaper 
Enterprise ̂ Assoc. Inc., 1970), p. 573 « 
3^Lipset, p. 46. 
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socio-economic class differences produces dramatic tensionso 
In the plural society of Kenya, if one tribe begins to out­
distance other tribes in its economic development (as the 
Kikuyu tribe may well be doing), then tribal conflict is 
imminent and the legitimacy of the political union in Kenya 
is threatened. To go one step further, if the Kikuyu 
attempt by oathing or by other means to buttress the 
threatened government by seeking to consolidate their own 
tribal hegemony, then the government will only be preserved 
through a great effort of force and repression. Socio­
economic differences in correlation with primordial divi­
sions are at the core of the Asian-African conflict, and 
they may well lead in the near future to an intensified 
African tribal struggle. 
Summary 
The attempt in this chapter has been to focus on 
the very important African tribal relationships. The 
quality of these relationships and the outcome of the 
effort to avoid a class structure in Kenya will be of 
primary importance to the unity of that country. 
CHAPTER V 
PRIMORDIAL GROUPS IN KENYA AND ELSEWHERE 
In this final chapter the author reverts to the 
theme of primordial groups first presented in the Intro­
duction. The attempt here will be to analyze primordial 
groups as political groups, to show their qualitative 
distinctions and possible uses in future studies. 
Kenya As a Plural Society 
The idea that Kenya possesses a plural society was 
first presented in the Introduction,^ and the discussion 
which followed was, in part, an attempt to demonstrate or 
prove this plural nature for Kenya's society. Several 
pertinent observations may be drawn from the discussion: 
1, Because of a relative absence of value con­
sensus, conflict rather than consensus characterizes Kenya's 
society. 
^See pp. 1-3. For an introductory work on the 
theory of plural societies see Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith 
(eds.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of Galifôrnia Press, 1969). Significant 
writings on plural societies include those by Smith, Kuper, 
van den Berghe and Furniwall. (See bibliography for 
complete listing.) 
108 
109 
2. There exists in Kenya a relative rigidity and 
clarity of group definition. 
3. Kenya's society also displays a relative segmen­
tation in the character of group relationships» Integrated 
behavior is not typical in Kenya. Social institutions cor­
respond to rather than overlap the primordial group boun­
daries. The manner in which individuals of separate groups 
act toward one another is restricted and ritualized. 
As evidence of the social cleavages and divisions 
in Kenya, five different sets of primordial groups were 
examinedÎ 
1. The Asian Racial Group 
2. The African Tribal Groups 
3. The Asian Racial Group 
4o The Asian Caste-Sect Groups 
5. The European Racial Group 
Primordial Groups As Political Groups 
2 All social groups have interests, and because pri­
mordial groups are a special type or category of social 
^Thus Arthur F. Bentley writes: "There is no group 
without its interest. An interest . „ „ is the equivalent 
of a group. We may speak also of an interest group or a 
group interest, again merely for the sake of clearness in 
expression. The group and the interest are not separate. 
There exists only the one thing, that is, so many men bound 
together in or along the path of a certain activity." 
Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government: A Study 
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groups, they too have interests. Some, but not all, 
social groups are also political groups, that is, they 
direct their interest or activity in an attempt to influence 
government policy. The discussion of Kenya showed primor­
dial groups in that country performing such an activity. 
A qualification must be recognized here in that it is 
theoretically possible to conceive of a relatively weak 
primordial group out of one of the five aforementioned sets 
which is apolitical. Such apolitical behavior is not likely 
to be the case, however, and it is certainly not the norm. 
Whenever there is contact between a primordial group and 
government, that primordial group takes on a political 
interest. The very act of claiming official recognition 
as a group (even if it is only to be recognized as such in 
a census) makes the primordial group political. The pri­
mordial groups of Kenya can, with justification, be called 
political groups. 
The act of raising Kenya's primordial groups to the 
level of political groups makes possible the comparison of 
the primordial groups with other types of political groups. 
Differences and distinctions can be demonstrated in a con­
sideration of political group origins and activities. 
Social Pressures (Bloomington, Ind.: Principia Press, 
1949), p. 211. 
1 1 1  
Qualitative Distinctions of Kenya's 
Primordial Groups As 
Political Groups 
A Social Basis 
In societies less plural than Kenya's, the origin 
of political groups is more likely to center on economic 
rather than social cleavages. Thus in the relatively 
homogeneous American society no student of politics could 
afford to ignore such significant political groups as the 
labor unions, business associations or occupational organi­
zations. Even before the United States had its Constitu­
tion, it was concluded in Federalist Number 10 that 
. . the most common and durable source of factions has 
3 been the various and unequal distribution of property." 
In Kenya, however, economic groups play a far less 
important function and the prime factor in political group 
formation thus far has been primordial social attraction. 
Several reasons account for this tendency for primordial 
groups to form and become politically active. 
1. Economic and social differences have often 
coincided in Kenya, When the racial pyramid was formed 
with Europeans on the top, Asians in the middle and 
Africans on the bottom, the hierarchy was both economic 
and social in nature. 
^The Federalist (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
lÔÔÔ), p. 54c 
1 1 2  
2o Primordial sentiments have often coincided 
with territorial possession. Each African tribe had its 
own traditional area, and the Europeans looked upon the 
Highlands as their own region. The Mau Mau struggle was 
to a great degree a dispute based on conflicting land 
claims » 
3o Some primordial groups have been intentionally 
made participants in the political system. Through 
Indirect Rule the colonial government recognized the 
African tribes as political units. Through communal repre­
sentation all three racial groups participated in the 
governmental policy-making process. 
4o One set of primordial groups, the African 
tribes, had at one time their own separate and distinct 
societies. 
Primordial Groups and 
Common Social Value's" 
Value consensus, by very definition, exists to a 
greater degree in a more homogeneous society than it does 
in a more plural society. The degree of value consensus 
in a society is directly related to the range of activities 
of political groups in that society. When a high degree of 
consensus exists in a society, the political groups will be 
much more likely to accept as "given" the legitimacy of the 
political system and the "rules of the political game." 
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The evidence does not indicate that the primordial 
groups of Kenya have yet accepted common social values. 
The European group, for example, came close to revolution 
in its reaction to the Wood-Winterton Agreement of 1922.^ 
During the Emergency and Mau Mau rebellion the Kikuyu 
tribe, or at least a large percentage of that group, 
attacked the legitimacy of colonial rule. Since indepen­
dence, the Somali tribe has fought inclusion within the 
Kenyan society. Thus the repertory of possible political 
actions by the primordial groups includes violent action 
against government in an attempt to overthrow the political 
system or to opt out of society altogether. 
The Primordial Groups 
and Kenya's Boundaries 
The case of the Somali tribe of northeast Kenya 
points to another distinctive socio-political feature of 
the primordial groups in Kenya. Some of the primordial 
groups, such as the Somali, overlap into neighboring 
countries and are thereby cut by the international boun­
daries, Primordial groups which are so split fall into 
two different categories: 
1. Groups which are divided by the fact that the 
border cuts a primordial group population and its tradi­
tional territory. Examples include the Somali, Masai and 
^See pp. 35-36 above. 
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and Abaluhya tribes, 
2, Groups whose population only is divided. 
Examples here include the Asian racial group and the 
Asian caste-sect groups.^ 
The tendency for primordial groups which are com­
pletely contained within Kenya's national boundaries is to 
fear and resist the political power and authority of the 
national government. This tendency is much more marked for 
those primordial groups which have traditional territories. 
The tendency to resist the national authority was quite 
evident, for example, in the initial tribal response to 
British attempts to colonize Kenya. 
For those primordial groups which are divided by 
Kenya's national boundaries and are residing therefore in 
both Kenya and a neighboring country there have been two 
separate tendencies. The groups have tended either to 
resist the authority of both national governments or to 
resist one government and accept the other. These tenden­
cies have, once again, been more marked for those primordial 
groups which have traditional territories (i.e. the groups 
of category 1 ).. 
The Masai tribe provides one example of a divided 
primordial group from category 1. The Masai, who are 
^There were in I960 about 87,000 Asians in Tanzania 
and about 75,000 in Uganda. Delf, pp. 54-48, 
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divided by the boundary between Kenya and Tanzania, have 
tended to resist the authority of both national govern­
ments. A second example of a primordial group from cate­
gory 1 is the Somali tribe which is divided by the Kenya-
Somali Republic boundary. The tendency for the Somali 
tribesmen has been to resist violently the attempts by the 
Kenyan Government to extend its authority over them. These 
tribesmen have not tended to act similarly, however, towards 
the national government of the Somali Republic. Because 
of an attachment to the Somali society (an attachment based 
on common primordial ties), the Somali tribe has given 
evidence of an eagerness to become part of the Somali 
society and to accept the authority of the Somali Government. 
The Performance of Interest Articulation 
by Kenya's Primordial Groups^ 
Latent and Manifest Interests 
The interests of the primordial groups in Kenya 
have, at times, been conspicuous or manifest. The African 
tribes openly fought British imperialism. The Asian EAING 
&This section on interest articulation applies some 
ideas developed by Gabriel Almond and George I. Blanksten 
in their discussions of political groups. See: Gabriel À, 
Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative 
Politics," in The Politics of the Developing Areas, ed, 
Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, I960), pp. 33-34; and George I. 
Blanksten, "Political Groups in Latin America," The American 
Political Science Review, LIII, No, 1 (March 1959), 106-12?. 
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overtly resisted colonial racial policies. The Europeans 
publicly protested the Wood-Winterton Agreement. 
Very often, however, the primordial group interests 
have been concealed or latent. Such concealment reflects, 
in part, a repressive political history in Kenya. The full 
resentment of the Kikuyu tribe, for example was only made 
manifest when frustrated tribal members were motivated to 
turn to violence and Mau Mau activities for the expression 
of their rejection of colonial racism. 
But in addition to the repressive nature of Kenya's 
political system, the common inclination of primordial 
groups to have latent political interests reflects a dis­
tinctive quality of these groups. Clifford Geertz has 
perceived latent articulation to be a common feature of 
primordial political groups (he terms them "-political 
solidarities") throughout the newly independent nations of 
the world. "Primordially based political solidarities," 
he writes, ""have a deeply abiding strength in most of the 
new states, but it is not always an active and immediately 
apparent one." Rather, the political interest is latent, 
". . . lying concealed in the enduring structure of pri­
mordial identification, ready to take explicit political 
form given only the proper sorts of social conditions. . . . 
^Geertz, p. 114* 
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Two examples of primordial group political interest 
latency in Kenya are found in the activities of the Asian 
caste-sect groups and the Kipsigis tribal group. The 
existence of the Asian caste-sect groups explains for the 
most part the political weakness of the Asian racial group. 
Because the Asians are divided into so many strong sub­
groups, they have not been able to take a united political 
stand. The fact that the Asian caste-sect groups have 
strong interests is not, however, readily apparent. Very 
often these interests have remained well-concealed and the 
only surface evidence has been the political weakness of 
the Asian racial group. 
In somewhat similar fashion, the interests of the 
Kipsigis tribal group have remained concealed since inde­
pendence. The Kipsigis people, like many other Kenyans, 
have become increasingly resentful of the growing political 
and economic strength of the Kikuyu tribe. This resentment 
was hidden for the most part, however, until the recent 
upsurge in tribalism when the Kipsigis ejected Kikuyus 
from the traditional area of the Kipsigis tribe.^ Only 
then did the group interests surface. 
There is a politically secret or latent aspect to 
Kikuyu oathing as well. No one knows for sure who has 
taken the oath and who has not. The political interest of 
^See footnote 10, p. 94. 
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these oaths remains concealed, "ready to take explicit 
political form," as Geertz writes, "given only the proper 
sorts of social conditions. , , 
Associational and Non-
Associational Articulation 
Sometimes, when the political interest of the 
primordial group was expressed, it was done so in an 
organized manner. The primordial group could then be 
called politically associational. The EAINC , for example, 
performed the function of political articulation for the 
Asian Racial Group. 
KANU, the present ruling party, has enough of a 
multigroup membership to preclude calling any primordial 
group associational on the basis of the party's existence. 
It might be argued, however, that the KPU performed a 
political interest articulation function for the Luo 
g 
tribe. If so, then the Luo tribe was politically associ­
ational until the KPU was banned in 1969. 
Specific and General Interests 
An important feature of Kenya's primordial groups 
is that while they have expressed specific interests, 
i.e. interests pertaining to a particular policy, these 
specific interests are very often only parts of more broad 
%ee p. 92 above. 
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or general interests. 
This tendency toward general interests is demon­
strated in the activities of the three racial groups in 
Kenya. The European group, for example, demanded specifi­
cally that Asians be excluded from land in the Highlands, 
but this demand was only part of a general European group 
interest. In this paper the general European group 
interest has been termed the European Racist Syndrome 
In a similar manner, the Asian group fought against 
the specific colonial policy of urban segregation. Once 
again, however, this Asian action was but a part of a 
general Asian group interest in rejecting the whole range 
of colonial racist policies. 
The African group, under Mboya's leadership, 
fought the specific policy of multiracial rule for Kenya. 
But as with the Europeans and Asians, this specific African 
action was only part of a general group interest. In this 
case, the general African interest was in achieving inde-
,pendence. 
James Coleman emphasizes the general interests of 
primordial groups throughout underdeveloped nations in 
observing the "critical fact" of these nations is that 
"interests still tend to be defined predominantly in terms 
of tribe, race, religion, or communal reference 
lOgee pp. 19-21 above. 
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group.^ 
Possible Benefits of Using the Primordial 
Group Concept 
The reference to primordial groups has, to this 
point, been limited to the five sets of primordial groups 
in Kenya, This limited reference was done with purpose, 
for although other authors have written about "primordial 
attachments," "primordially based political solidarities" 
and ""primordial loyalties," the concept of primordial 
groups is original with this paper. The proof of the use­
fulness of the primordial group concept, it was felt, must 
first come in a demonstration of its productive application 
in the analysis of a single country's socio-political 
system. 
The fact, however, that authors such as James 
Coleman, Clifford Geertz and David E, Apter have employed 
the idea of primordial attachments in discussing several 
1 ? countries suggests that the concept of primordial groups 
James S. Coleman, "Conclusion? The Political 
Systems of the Developing Areas," in Almond and Coleman, 
p. 535. 
1^See the quotations by Geertz (p. 1l6) and Cole­
man (p. 119) above. Apter writes that: "The first problem 
faced by the new nations is that of creating over-arching 
loyalties that will transcend the primordial ones of ethnic 
membership, religious affiliation, and linguistic identi­
fication," David E, Apter, The Politics of Modernization 
(Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1965), pT 294. 
121 
might have further significance. 
The following discussion lists three possible appli­
cations for the primordial group concept in political 
science, 
The Ill-Defined Boundaries 
of Political Systems 
The primordial group concept is useful in that in 
many countries such as Kenya boundaries between the politi­
cal systemand other systems within the society are not 
clear cut, 
Gabriel Almond writes: 
Political scientists know in a general way that 
political control in a society is just one of a num­
ber of social control systems, such as religion, the 
family, the economic organization, and the like. 
What he /sic7 is less likely to be aware of is the 
fact that the form and control of the political system 
in a society will vary with the form and content of 
the religious, family, and other systems in a 
society. . , . The essential point here is that crucial 
interrelations which we may miss when we examine the 
fully differentiated, more or less autonomous political 
system in the West stand out more clearly in primitive 
and non-Western contexts.14 
By utilizing primordial groups we can easily get at 
1^Gabriel Almond's definition of political system 
is employed in this paper. He writes: * . the political 
system is that system which performs the functions of inte­
gration and adaptation (both internally and vis-a-vis other 
societies) by means of the employment, or threat of employ­
ment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion." 
Almond and Coleman, p. 7. 
"'^Almond and Coleman, p. 10. 
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these "crucial relationships" between political and other 
control systems. Such relationships were demonstrated for 
Kenya to the extent that the five sets of primordial groups 
played political functions. 
The relevance of primordial groups to the political 
systems in non-Western nations varies somewhat from country 
to country. In Africa such relevance is dependent especi­
ally on the nature of the colonial rule; the nature of the 
integrative influence; the size, cohesion and compatibility 
of the groups; and the stability or fragility of national 
institutions.But the relevance of even non-associational, 
latently articulate primordial groups in Africa and elsewhere 
should not be overlooked.^^ 
The Basic Problem in 
Plural Societies 
A second reason for the employment of the primordial 
group concept is that it clearly exposes the basic problem 
in plural societies such as Kenya's--the problem of holding 
together. As Clifford Geertz writes: 
I^See James S. Coleman and Carl G, Rosberg Jr., 
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical 
Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1966), p. 6ÔÔ0 
1&This fact has not, of course, gone unrecognized. 
See the works of such students of non-Western societies 
as Hunger, Paliers, Skinner and Southall. (See biblio­
graphy for complete listing.) 
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Economic or class or intellectual disaffection 
threatens revolution, but disaffection based on race, 
language, or culture threatens partition, irredentism, 
or merger, a redrawing of the very limits of the 
state, a new definition of its domain.17 
It is an interesting historical fact that the 
approach of independence for colonial societies very often 
brought about an unstable social situation leading to in­
creased rather than decreased primordial group conflict. 
A new self-awareness of social group identity was fostered 
during this period which coupled with growing demands for 
self-determination. Often times the social group boun­
daries did not correspond to colonial-drawn national 
boundaries, and the push for self-determination threatened 
to destroy those boundaries. Ideas of self-determination 
may be rooted, also, in fears of continued domination by a 
new group or coalition of groups. This fear took expression 
in Kenya in the formation of KADU by several smaller tribes 
which were apprehensive about a possible Kikuyu-Luo hegemony 
at independence. 
In many of the new nations, and especially in 
Africa, unity is still threatened by the micro-nationalism 
^^Geertz, p. 111. 
I^See Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The 
Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples 
(Cambridge, Mass.r Harvard University Press, 1960), 
pp. 329-359; James S. Coleman, "The Politics of Sub-
Saharan Africa," in Almond and Coleman, p. 31â; and Cole­
man and Rosberg, pp. 688-690. 
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of primordial groups and the syncretic process is still 
menaced by primordial attachments. An understanding of 
primordial groups is basic to the study of these nations 
because it locates the social units which produce the 
plural societies and reveals the ties and conflicts between 
these units. James Coleman and Carl G„ Rosberg write; 
. . .  i n  t h e  n e w  s t a t e s  J Z f  A f r i c a 7 ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l l y  
relevant cultures are not those of the new nations 
the state builders are seeking to create; rather, 
they are those of the hundreds of heterogeneous 
ethnic communities and tribal societies arbitrarily 
bunched together within the artificial boundaries 
imposed during the colonial period.19 
Myron Weiner has distinguished five types of inte-
p  r \  
gration being pursued today in the new nations. These 
are: 
1. National integration, the unification of 
"culturally and socially discrete groups," 
2. Territorial integration, the extension of the 
authority of the national government over the national 
territory. 
3. Value integration, the acceptance of procedures 
for conflict resolution. 
4. Elite-mass integration, the briding of class 
"'^Colemàn and Rosberg, p. 2. 
20Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political 
Development," The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. CCCLVIII (March 1965). 
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divisions « 
5. Integrative behavior, the acceptance of pro­
cedures for working together. 
Overcoming primordial group differences is a 
function of , national integration, but the following 
examples from Kenya illustrate the fact that the existence 
of primordial groups in Kenya affects every type of inté­
grât ive effort. 
Territorial integration.--The dispatch of Kenyan 
troops to the northeast area of the country to quell the 
Shifta uprising is clearly an attempt at territorial inte­
gration {§2). The root of the problem, however, lies in 
the primordial attachments of Somali tribesmen with their 
brothers in the Somali Republic. 
Value integration.--The Kenyan Government action in 
maximizing uniformity by banning KPU is an effort to bring-
about value integration. {§3) « The basis for KPU, however, 
was largely as an interest-articulating organization for a 
primordial group--the Luo tribe. 
Elite-mass integration.--The endeavor at elite-mass 
integration (^4) in Kenya is, once again, complicated by 
primordial group problems. The new African elite in Kenya 
comes mostly from peasant (mainly Kikuyu) rather than 
pastoral tribes. The significance of restricted recruitment 
for the elite is shown in this quotation by Coleman and 
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Rosberg: 
When primordial loyalty coincides with, and is 
therefore enormously fortified by, other interests 
of an economic, social or class character, the 
resulting combination is powerful, and virtually 
indestructible. Throughout Africa, certain tribal, 
linguistic, or ethnic groups are in a more advan­
tageous competitive position than others.21 
Integrative behavior.--The great interest shown by 
members of the Asian Racial Group in involving themselves 
as students and teachers in Kenya's educational system 
demonstrates an attempt at Weiner's fifth type of integra­
tive behavior, the acceptance of procedures for working 
together. 
Before leaving the discussion of the relationship 
of primordial groups to the problem of integrating plural 
societies, mention must be made of the fact that primordial 
groups can play a functional role in these dynamic new 
societies. This role was not mentioned in the discussion 
of Kenya's society, but some authors have seen benefits in 
the existence of primordial tribal ties in the new African 
states. 
Tom Mboya and Max Gluckman both comment on the fact 
that with rapid urbanization now taking place in Africa 
some of the social, psychological and economic burdens in 
the new states have been shouldered by the traditional 
21 Coleman and Rosberg, p. 690. 
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22 tribal groupso Immanuel Wallerstein and James Coleman 
have commented, in addition, on the political advantage 
for an African nation in possessing a multiplicity of small 
tribes (such as is the case in Tanzania, the country to 
Kenya's immediate south). These authors see more possi­
bility for authoritarianism in a country which has many 
small tribeso 
A Possibility for Cross-
National Comparisons 
A final benefit to be gained from using the pri­
mordial group concept is that it opens possibilities for 
cross-national comparisons. Such comparisons could be 
either of two types. 
1. Comparisons could be made between primordial 
political groups and political groups in more integrated 
societies. A start in this direction was made in this 
chapter with the introduction of the idea that as political 
groups the primordial groups of Kenya had some distinctive 
features. A logical next step would be to compare primor­
dial groups as a type with descriptions of political groups 
drawn largely from the American sample--descriptions 
possibly by authors such as Arthur F. Bentley, Earl Latham, 
^^Mboya, pp. 55-91 ; and Max Gluckman, "Tribalism in 
Modern British Central Africa," in Social Change? The 
Colonial Situation, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1966), 
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David B, Truman and Robert A„ Dahl.^^ 
2. A second cross-national comparison could be 
made between plural societies which contain primordial 
groups. Both Clifford Geertz and Pierre van den Berghe 
see promise in such comparisons»^^ The process would 
involve a gathering of data on the number, size and 
relationships of primordial groups in several societies. 
Comparisons then would hopefully reveal something of the 
contrasting natures of those societies and expectations 
for their futures» 
Z^See the bibliography for relevant works by these 
authors. 
^^See Geertz, especially pp» 114-11#; and 
van den Berghe, Race and Racism» 
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APPENDIX A 
Tribal  Distribution in Kenya 
BORAN 
^^ARakvvet 
BORAN ) 0^ 
KIKUYU Over 1,000,000 
KISH 500,OCX)-999,999 
NANDI 250,000 499,999 
EMBU 100,000 - 249,999 
SAMBURU 50,000 - 99,999 
Cabbra 10,000 - 49,999 
NJEMPS Less than 10.000 
TAITA 
100 Miles 
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APPENDIX B 
Kenya's Provinces and Districts  (1966) 
I [ 
E 1 n I 0 P I A 
SUDAN/ 
SOMALI U (; A N I) A I 
R E P U B L I C  
il / \ S 
VALLEYV---
V ; 
27 
EASTERN 
NORTH 
EASTERN WESTERN 
KEY TO DISTRICTS 
13 Laikipio 23 Meru 
U. Uoiin Giihu 29. Embu 
I Bungoma 
3 Kokomega 15 Nana 
À Control 16. Kericho 
Nyonio 17 Nakuru 
5. South 18 Nofok 
Nyonia 19 Kojiodo 
6 Kill! 20 Nyondorua 
7. '[urkona 21 Nyefi 
8. Somburu 22 Kiriny-go 
9.WojtPokot 23 Murong o 
10 Tron$ Nzoio 24. Kiombu 
II. Elgpyo 25 Thiko 
Morokwof 26 Mortobit 
12 Bortngo 2/. Ijlolo 
30 KituI 
31 Mochokos 
32 Mondera 
33. Wo|ir 
34. Gorlssa 
35. Tono River 
36 loniu 
38. Kilif, 
39. Kwols 
40. MomboJa 
41. Nairobi 
C O A S T  
LY D IA Y 
O CE AY 
*Nofe; Nairobi A r e a  has the 
ifotuj of o province 
I I 
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